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ON PAGE 1

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 December 1980

Reagan cabinet: tough, pragmatic team shaping up

By Godfrey Sperting Jr.
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington
Ronald Reagan is not reaching out for ideologues as he sifts candidates for his top appointments.

Instead, the common element apparent in likely selections — such as Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr. (USA, ret.) for secretary of state, Caspar W. Weinberger for secretary of defense, William French Smith as attorney general, and William J. Casey as CIA director — is a hard-nosed ability to operate well in situations where practical, tough judgments must be made.

A source close to the President-elect says of the Reagan selections: "Reagan is not going to have one extreme or the other in his cabinet, those whose passions might cause conflict and make it difficult to get the job done."

There are, in fact, some ideological lines. General Haig is a moderate on domestic matters, a hard-liner on defense.

Mr. Weinberger is somewhere near the middle of the GOP spectrum on domestic issues. But he is a dedicated budget-cutter who wields a sharp knife when it comes to waste.

Mr. Casey's early political ties were with Dwight D. Eisenhower. Also, Casey is a New York Republican, which means he is a little more moderate than Republicans elsewhere.

Walter H. Wriston, chairman of Citicorp, is being mentioned for Treasury. He too is much more a pragmatist than a political ideologue. But, says one Reagan associate, "I don't think he'll get it."

"He [Wriston] is very used to dealing with a lot of Democrats," one observer here says. "He, like Casey, is a New York Republican, certainly somewhere in the Republican middle in his philosophy."

Mr. Smith, Reagan's longtime attorney, is known to be a consistent conservative who has been influential in shaping the President-elect's outlook on politics and issues.

But Smith also is not considered to be on

the far right.

Other names of possible Reagan appointees also surfacing include:

- Former US Sen. Clifford P. Hansen of Wyoming for interior secretary.

- Drew Lewis, deputy chairman of the Republican National Committee, for secretary of transportation.

- Thomas Sowell, a University of California economist and a black, for secretary of housing and urban development.

- Ray Donovan, a construction company executive who was in charge of the Reagan campaign in New Jersey, for labor secretary.

- Bill Brock, chairman of the Republican National Committee, for secretary of commerce.

Another being mentioned for labor secretary is Betty Murphy, former chairwoman of the National Labor Relations Board.

No definite ideological thread is apparent in this list of names either, although Mr. Hansen is known to be on the conservative side and the others perhaps more moderate.

But this same source close to Reagan insists that "loyalty, of course, is a test. But competence is of prime importance. And ideology is secondary."

The cabinet selections are being watched closely for what they may disclose about the President-elect's intentions and about his own political philosophy.

Says one Reagan source: "[He] is setting up this cabinet government, where he will be meeting with some four to seven of his cabinet secretaries every day. He wants people he feels comfortable with — people who get along with each other. That's a basic consideration in these appointments."

In this vein, it is understood that William Simon, a favorite candidate of conservatives for secretary of the Treasury, was eliminated from consideration. Some advisers told the President-elect that, while highly competent, Mr. Simon is not a "team player" and that his abrasiveness would be detrimental to the smooth running of the administration.

ARTICLE 10
ON PAGE 24

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 December 1980

'Twas the night before Reagan

'Twas the night before Reagan, when all
through the House
And specially in the Senate not even a
mouse
Could list the big cheeses in the whole new
batch,
Such as Labor Committee chairman Orrin
Hatch
Or the next voice you hear when you ring
your Don Ameche
For the Budget Committee head, Pete V.
Domenici.

So our stockings are hung in hopes they
will fill.
Not only with names from Capitol Hill,
But with all who may get a Washington
lease.
Under presidential counsel Edwin Meese.
And don't forget that transition team all
sung in their beds.
While visions of cabinet phonsa dance in
their heads.

It's true that the forecasts remain a little
vague
But "sources" keep bringing up Alexander
Haig
And other alumni from administrations
past
Instead of the expected brand new cast.
But there are some other names the gov-
ernment phone book may be listin'
Such as possible secretary of the treasury
Walter E. Wriston
And William French Smith, Mr. Reagan's
personal lawyer.
An attorney general who wouldn't be kept
waiting in the foyer.
Or there could be a change at the CIA, see?
Maybe campaign chieftain William J.
Casey.

And some say the secretary of transpor-
tation's shoe is
On the foot of a Pennsylvanian named
Drew Lewis.
With Richard Schweiker, who is also from
Penn.
Mentioned for a post, we wonder what then
For William Scranton, a third from
Pennsylvania?
His absence from the press's speculation
mania

Is like that of Elliot Richardson and some
other GOP voices
Who could hardly be overlooked before the
final choices.
But we digress in the age of Bill Brock.
Who may go to Commerce while Agricul-
ture goes to John Block.

As for those who are already home free,
Here are some names we find under
the tree.

If not a baker's dozen there's a Baker
times two.
Majority leader Howard and James, chief
of the White House crew.
And note the Senate committee chairmen
to put on the roll,
Such as Environment's Robert Stafford
and Finance's Robert Dole.

Just to add to the bubbling Republican
broth.

Governmental Affairs will have William V.
Roth.

Tilting Agriculture's far-flung realms
Will be the man at the tiller, Jesse Helms.
While Energy's Idaho dynamo, as it were,
Comes under the name of James A.
McClure.

And Foreign Relations will be at the tender
mercy

Of Illinois internationalist Charles H.
Percy.

Closing the door of Banking's barn
Before the horses are stolen will be the job
of Jake Garn.

And to make Armed Services flourish and
flower

Hopes will ride high on John G. Tower.

On Appropriations Mr. Hatfield will sign
his Mark.

While Mr. Thurmond will Strom the Judi-
ciary strings from dawn to dark.

In the Commerce Committee any Demo-
cratic attack would

Be repelled by Oregon's not Robert but
plain Bob Packwood.

And at Veterans Affairs an ex-GI looking
for a pal

Will find Alan K. Simpson - "You know
me, Al."

The long line of names spirals out of our
sight.

So for now, Happy Reagan, and to all a
good night!

NEW YORK TIMES

4 DEC. 1980

SEC-SAFIRE-COLUMN2

COMMENTARY

SUBJECT: THE MADISON GROUP

BY WILLIAM SAFIRE

FC. 1980 N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERVICE

WASHINGTON - ON JAN. 4 OF THIS YEAR, A DOZEN MEN GATHERED IN ROOM 607 OF THE MADISON HOTEL IN WASHINGTON, D.C., TO SEE WHAT THEY COULD DO TO OUST SOFT-LINERS FROM POWER.

MOST WERE ABOUT 35 YEARS OLD; ALL WERE HAWKS IN FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE FIELDS; ALL WERE PRESENT OR FORMER CONGRESSIONAL STAFFERS; ALL HAD SECURITY CLEARANCES OF TOP SECRET OR HIGHER.

FOR STUDENTS OF WASHINGTON'S UNDERGROUND "POWER RING," WHERE OLD-BOY NETWORKS ARE REPLACED BY NEW-BOY NETWORKS; WHICH IN TURN ARE OUSTED BY NEWER-BOY NETWORKS; THE BIPARTISAN MADISON GROUP - WHICH MET EVERY OTHER FRIDAY FOR LUNCH TO DEVISE WAYS TO BEDEVIL, EMBARRASS AND DEFEAT THE DOVES IN HIGH PLACES - OFFERS A FASCINATING CASE STUDY. THE ORGANIZER WAS JOHN CARBAUGH, WHO HAD BEEN PRESS AIDE TO STROM THURMOND, EARNED A LAW DEGREE, AND HAS SERVED JESSE HELMS SINCE 1974. CARBAUGH HAD HELPED ORCHESTRATE THE BLOCKING OF SALT II RATIFICATION IN 1979; HE FORMED THE INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN RELATIONS, A TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATION THAT NETTED A HALF-MILLION DOLLARS TO FINANCE A NEWSLETTER AND LATER PUBLISH A BOOK, "A PROGRAM FOR MILITARY INDEPENDENCE"; IT ALSO PAID FOR LUNCHEONS AND TRIPS FOR THE MADISON GROUP.

AMONG THE EARLY MEMBERS WERE SVEN KRAEHER, (SENATOR TOWER'S STAFF); HUENTIN CROMHELIN JR. (THURMOND); TIDAL MCCOY (GARN); RICHARD PERLE (EX-JACKSON); WILLIAM SCHNEIDER (REPRESENTATIVE KEMP); MICHEL PILLSBURY (SENATE STEERING); DAVID SULLIVAN (SEN. GORDON HUMPHREY); JACK DAVIS (STONE); ROBERT ANDREWS (GLENN); MARK SCHNEIDER (GARN); ANGELO LORDEVILLA (WALLOP); MARGO CARLISLE (MCCLOURE). THE "OUTSIDER" WAS CHARLES KUPPERMAN, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER, WHO LATER BECAME INFORMAL LIAISON WITH RONALD REAGAN'S RICHARD ALLEN.

THE MADISON GROUP WAS LOOSE, INCHOATE, BUT EFFECTIVE IN DRAWING ISSUES - BURYING SALT II; CHALLENGING AID TO NICARAGUA'S LEFTISTS; AND ABOVE ALL INCREASING THE DEFENSE BUDGET. AT THE SAME TIME, SOME MEMBERS EXCELLED IN CHANNELING OTHERWISE UNOBTAINABLE INFORMATION ABOUT U.S. WEAKNESSES TO LIKE-MINDED MEMBERS OF THE MEDIA.

BY COMBINING LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES WITH NEWS MANAGEMENT, THE GROUP IMITATED AND COUNTERED THE MANIPULATION OF ITS MIRROR-IMAGE IN THE ADMINISTRATION - THE GROUP OF DOVES THAT JOHN CARBAUGH LIKES TO CALL "THE RONDALE MAFIA."

MOST OF THE TIME: THE MADISON GROUP OPERATED AS A SEPARATE LOCUS OF POWER: WITH THE STAFFERS' SENATORS NOT FULLY KNOWING (OR WANTING TO KNOW) WHAT THEIR EMPLOYEES WERE DOING. THUS: CARBAUGH'S OPERATION CAN BE VIEWED AS (1) A CABAL OF AMBITIOUS, UNSUPERVISED IDEOLOGUES OUT TO GRAB POWER: OR (2) A PATRIOTIC TASK FORCE DRAWN TOGETHER BY A GREAT ISSUE - THE DANGEROUS DRIFT OF AMERICAN SECURITY.

"WE STOLE THE DOVES' IDEA," EXPLAINS CARBAUGH TODAY. IN THE 1976 INTERREGNUM, ACCOMMODATIONISTS SHREWDLY HELPED EACH OTHER INTO SECOND-LEVEL POSITIONS OF POLICY FORMULATION AND OPERATIONAL INFLUENCE. AS A RESULT: THE DOVISH MINDSETS OF WILLIAM MILLER, RICHARD MOOSE, DAVID HARRON, ANTHONY LAKE, DAVID MCCHIFFERT, ROGER HOLANDER AND MARSHALL SCHULMAN REINFORCED ONE ANOTHER AND DETERMINED THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN-DEFENSE COURSE, EASILY TURNING ASIDE THE HALF-HEARTED HAWKISHNESS OF A BRZEZINSKI.

TODAY: THE MADISON GROUP SEEKS TO FOLLOW THAT EXAMPLE. THE REAGAN DEFENSE TRANSITION TEAM IS STAFFED BY CARBAUGH, KRAEMER, MCCOY, PERLE AND BILL SCHNEIDER. THE REAGAN ARMS CONTROL TEAM HAS PILLSBURY AND SULLIVAN. THE REAGAN STATE DEPARTMENT TEAM HAS CARBAUGH AND PERLE, AND THE CIR TEAM HAS CORDEVILLA AND MARK SCHNEIDER. THE GROUP IS "IN."

THE MONDALE SET IS STILL FIGHTING - BILL MILLER OF THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE STAFF WAS ABLE TO GET BARRY GOLDWATER TO FIRE A COUPLE OF THE BEST MADISON GROUPIES, WHO WERE PROMPTLY REHired AFTER THE INTERCESSION OF OTHER MEMBERS' SENATORS.

NOW THAT THEY'RE TRIUMPHANT: WILL THE MADISON GROUP CLING TOGETHER IN POWER AS WELL AS THOSE DERIDED AS THE "MONDALE MAFIA"? PROBABLY NOT: POWER'S BELLS ARE BREAKING UP THAT OLD GANG OF NINE.

CARBAUGH AND PILLSBURY ARE FROWNING AT EACH OTHER ON THE ISSUE OF LOYALTY TO RICHARD ALLEN. PRO-HAIG AND ANTI-HAIG LINES ARE ALREADY BEING DRAWN. THE OUTGOING NETWORK IS SEEDING THE MEDIA WITH HORRIFIC TALES OF THE "CABAL," AND SOME ASSOCIATES OF GROUP MEMBERS ARE STILL IN SUCH A LEAKY HABIT THAT THE NEW YORK TIMES HAS BEEN RECEIVING COPIES OF ALL TRANSITION MEMOS EVEN BEFORE THE REAGAN HI-MUCKEYMUCKS DO.

DESPITE THESE CRACKS IN WHAT USED TO BE A UNITED FRONT: THE MADISON GROUP - THAT NEWEST-BOY-NETWORK, PLUS MARGO - WILL SLOT ITSELF INTO THE NICHE NOW OCCUPIED BY ITS IDEOLOGICAL ADVERSARY. THAT'S HEALTHY: WHEN THE VOTERS SPEAK: THE BUREAUCRACY SHOULD RESPOND.

THE POWER RONDE NEVER ENDS. EVEN AS I WRITE: SOME OF THE MORE AMBITIOUS DOVES ARE THINKING OF FORMING A GROUP TO GET OUT THE TRUTH ABOUT WHAT THE MADISON GROUP DOES WHILE IN POWER. GOOD! THEY KNOW WHERE THEY CAN REACH ME.

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ARM-REAGAN-SOVIETS:450

REAGAN TRANSITION WARNED OF APPROACHES FROM SOVIET AGENTS

BY ROBERT PHRY

ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

WASHINGTON (AP) - RONALD REAGAN'S TRANSITION TEAM HAS BEEN WARNED BY THE CIA TO BE ALERT FOR APPROACHES FROM SOVIET AGENTS FOLLOWING TWO SUCH CONTACTS ALREADY MADE WITH AIDES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT; A REAGAN TRANSITION OFFICIAL SAID WEDNESDAY.

CIA AGENTS TUESDAY NIGHT BRIEFED 300 MEMBERS OF THE TRANSITION TEAM; DISCLOSING THE TWO CONTACTS AND CAUTIONING THE GROUP ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE OVERTURES; ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL SPEAKING WITH THE UNDERSTANDING OF ANONYMITY.

WHAT THE SOVIET AGENTS WERE AFTER AND WHEN THE CONTACTS WERE MADE WERE NOT DISCLOSED. NEITHER WERE THE IDENTITIES OR POSITIONS OF THE TWO TRANSITION OFFICIALS WHO WERE APPROACHED.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIALS "SAID WE SHOULD BE VERY CIRCUMSPECT. THAT WE COULD BE CONSIDERED TARGETS" OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE; THE REAGAN OFFICIAL REPORTED. "THEY SAID TWO PEOPLE ON THE TRANSITION STAFF HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY SOVIET AGENTS. THEY SAID WE SHOULD BE VERY CAREFUL."

THE CIA AGENTS PARTICULARLY WARNED MEMBERS OF THE TRANSITION TEAM DEALING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS TO BE CAREFUL ABOUT SENSITIVE PAPERS THAT ARE LOCATED AT THE TRANSITION OFFICES; THE REAGAN OFFICIAL SAID.

THE OFFICIAL SAID THE WARNING APPEARED PRIMARILY INTENDED TO INFORM NEWCOMERS TO WASHINGTON ABOUT THE REALITIES OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY AND THE DANGERS OF HOLDING POSITIONS OF POWER.

"IT WAS SORT OF A LECTURE ON HOW TO BEHAVE," SHE SAID.

ONE OF THE CIA OFFICIALS WAS DESCRIBED AS A "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD AGENT" AND THE OTHER WAS IDENTIFIED AS A "SECURITY EDUCATION FIELD AGENT."

CIA OFFICIALS WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR COMMENT ON DETAILS OF THE SOVIET CONTACTS. FBI OFFICIALS SAID THEY WERE UNAWARE OF THE BRIEFING OR THE REPORTED CONTACT BY SOVIET AGENTS.

LARRY SPEAKES, A REAGAN SPOKESMAN, CONFIRMED THAT SOME "SECURITY OFFICIALS" BRIEFED A MEETING OF THE REAGAN TRANSITION TEAM. SPEAKES SAID VICE PRESIDENT-ELECT GEORGE BUSH AND TRANSITION DIRECTOR EDWIN MEESE III WERE AT THE BRIEFING.

Associated Press

BUT SPERKES DECLINED TO IDENTIFY THE SECURITY AGENTS. HE ADDED THAT HE KNEW OF NO SECURITY BREACH THAT HAD OCCURRED. THE BRIEFING WAS CLOSED TO THE PRESS AND PUBLIC.

THE REAGAN OFFICIAL SAID THE TRANSITION HIRED A FULL-TIME SECURITY OFFICER LAST WEEK; BUT ADDED THAT NO TIGHTENING IN SECURITY WAS IMMEDIATELY EVIDENT AS A RESULT OF THE CIA BRIEFING.

AN AIDE TO HEESE SAID THE SECURITY BRIEFING "WASN'T IN RESPONSE TO ANY ATTEMPTS AT INFILTRATION;" BUT RATHER WAS A ROUTINE PRECAUTION FOR NEWCOMERS TO WASHINGTON.

"I'D BE SURPRISED IF NOTHING LIKE THIS HAD HAPPENED. WE'RE RIGHT AROUND THE CORNER FROM THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY;" SAID THE AIDE; WHO ASKED NOT TO BE NAMED. "PEOPLE GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO GET INFORMATION IN THIS TOWN."

AP-NY-12-03 1956EST

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES
3 DECEMBER 1980

4 REPORTED CHOSEN AS THE INNER CIRCLE OF REAGAN CABINET

Haig at State Dept.; Weinberger at
Defense; Wriston at Treasury;
Smith, Attorney General

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 2 — President-elect Ronald Reagan, drawing on both the Eastern establishment and his West Coast political associates, has decided on the four men he wants to form the inner ring of his Cabinet, well-placed Republican sources said today.

These sources said that Mr. Reagan's choices were Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., retired, former Supreme Allied Commander (Europe) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for Secretary of State; Caspar W. Weinberger, Mr. Reagan's long-time adviser and now vice president of the Bechtel Corporation, for Secretary of Defense; Walter B. Wriston, chairman of Citicorp, for Secretary of the Treasury; and William French Smith, the President-elect's personal attorney and friend, for Attorney General.

Although all four men are known as conservatives Republicans, they are regarded as moderates and their selection seems to point toward a trend in Mr. Reagan's policy-making, following his pattern as Governor of California.

Caution on Clearances

The Republican sources cautioned that not all the necessary clearances had been completed and that Mr. Reagan had not formally offered the top Cabinet posts to these men or received their final acceptances.

These sources said that both Mr. Wriston and Mr. Smith had expressed some hesitancy about entering the Federal Government and that if they were to decline to serve it could lead to reshuffling among the top posts.

Associates of Mr. Reagan pointed out that although Mr. Weinberger very much wanted a foreign policy post, he was sufficiently versatile and experienced to shift to the Treasury Department if necessary.

Casey and Stockman Listed

Two other key Cabinet-level positions were also reported decided. Republican sources said that Mr. Reagan had decided to put his campaign director, William J. Casey, a New York tax lawyer, as Director of Central Intelligence, and had signaled his preference for Dave Stockman, a two-term Congressman from Michigan, as director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Although Reagan transition aides said that the President-elect was still working on some of his Cabinet choices, they reported that he had essentially settled on Senator Richard S. Schweiker of Pennsylvania to be Secretary of Health and Human Services and not Secretary of Labor, as previously reported.

They also said he was inclined to choose Drew Lewis, a Pennsylvania businessman who became one of his deputy campaign managers and deputy chairman of the Republican National Committee, as Secretary of Transportation.

In an apparently typical pattern, high-level Reagan aides reported that security clearance procedures had been initiated today on Mr. Stockman, but by late afternoon his friends said that he had not received any call from the President-elect asking him to take the job.

There were indications that the Reagan personnel operation was undertaking preliminary security checks and inquiries about potential conflicts of interests before any formal job offers or announcements were made to spare both Mr. Reagan and potential Cabinet appointees the embarrassment of later disclosures that would force a change in Mr. Reagan's choices.

According to some associates of Mr. Reagan, at least two prominent Republican political figures have been sounded out about Cabinet positions and turned them down. These sources said that John B. Connally, the former Governor of Texas, had rejected a chance to serve as Secretary of Energy and that Pete Wilson, Mayor of San Diego, had declined to be considered as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

Bill Brock, the Republican National chairman, has been mentioned as a possible Secretary of Commerce, but Reagan transition sources said that he was also under active consideration for Under Secretary of State. He has expressed an interest in both commerce and foreign affairs.

Possible Agriculture Choice

Although no decision is reported to have been made on the new Secretary of Agriculture, senior Reagan advisers here met today with John R. Block, former Director of Agriculture for Illinois, who is being pushed for the job by farm-state Senators like Bob Dole of Kansas.

The agriculture post could take on more than normal importance because in some preliminary plans prepared by top Reagan advisers, the Agriculture Secretary would sit in as a member of the inner Cabinet that Mr. Reagan intends to make his chief policy-making advisory group.

Because of its importance, the President-elect was reported to have concentrated initially on picking the key members of his Cabinet who would serve in that inner group, mainly the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury and the Attorney General.

The choices reported today reflected an evident effort by Mr. Reagan to achieve a balance in that group of Eastern establishment figures like Mr. Wriston and West Coast associates with whom he has long been comfortable, like Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Smith.

Blend of Old and New

The first four choices also reflect a balance of experienced Washington hands and newcomers to government. Mr. Haig, now 55 years old, not only served as commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization but also as White House chief of staff to President Nixon and as a deputy to Henry A. Kissinger when he was Mr. Nixon's national security adviser. At that time, Mr. Weinberger, who is now 63 years old, was budget director and later Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Previously, he had served as director of finance when Mr. Reagan was Governor of California.

Mr. Wriston, a widely respected New York banker, and Mr. Smith, a Los Angeles lawyer with family roots in Boston, have not served previously in government. Both men are in their early sixties. Mr. Smith is a long-time friend who served with Mr. Reagan on the University of California Board of Regents, and Mr. Wriston joined Mr. Reagan's economic advisory group last summer, in the midst of the Presidential campaign.

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ON PAGE A3

THE WASHINGTON POST
3 December 1980

Haig, Weinberger Top Choices in a Narrowing List for Cabinet

Yesterday's list of choices for the Reagan Cabinet focused on by-now-familiar names, including Alexander Haig for secretary of state, Caspar W. Weinberger for secretary of defense and William French Smith for attorney general.

The New York Daily News was farthest out on the limb, saying that President-elect Ronald Reagan had selected six persons — Haig, a former supreme commander of NATO; Weinberger, a longtime Reagan insider; Smith, Reagan's personal lawyer; Walter Wriston, chairman of Citicorp., as treasury secretary, William Casey, the president-elect's campaign director, as head of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Thomas Sowell, a conservative University of California economist and a black, as secretary of housing and urban development.

A top Reagan aide characterized the Daily News list as "50 percent wrong," but wouldn't say which half was right. The Washington Post contacted several of those on the list, who said that if they had been selected, it was news to them.

The Associated Press reported that Reagan had made offers to eight persons, but mentioned only four names as "likely" or "top picks" — Haig, Weinberger, Wriston and Casey — for the same posts the Daily News had listed.

EXCERPT

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ON PAGE A-1

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
3 DECEMBER 1980

Weinberger Likely to Get Key Position

But Aides to Reagan Say Choices Remain

By Jeremiah O'Leary

Washington Star Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES — Caspar Weinberger will be named to one of the big three positions — state, defense or Treasury — in the Reagan Cabinet, according to Reagan sources here.

"Once Weinberger's slot is known, the rest of the nominations will be easier to figure out," said a source close to President-elect Ronald Reagan.

Weinberger, who got the nickname "Cap the Knife" while working on the budget for the Nixon administration, is serving as Reagan's chief budget-cutter with responsibility for recommending cuts that would hold the fiscal 1981 budget to no more than \$620 billion.

Treasury secretary would be the logical position for that work, but there are persistent reports that he will go to state or the Pentagon.

If Weinberger were to become Treasury secretary, the way would be clear for retired Gen. Alexander Haig or Reagan campaign chief William J. Casey to become secretary of state and for either former Texas Gov. John B. Connally or former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to take over at the Pentagon. Casey also is seen as a front-runner for CIA director.

There also is speculation here that economist Alan Greenspan no longer is in contention for a Cabinet post.

Reagan sources report that a new name has been added to the list of leading contenders for Cabinet nomination: W. Malcolm Baldrige, chairman of Scoville Industries of Waterbury, Conn. He is said to be in good position for a Cabinet post, perhaps secretary of commerce. Baldrige was chairman of the Connecticut Reagan-Bush committee and co-chairman of Connecticut Citizens for Nixon and Agnew. He also is a member of the National Republican Finance Committee.

Reagan sources also say that Rep. David Stockman, R-Mich., is likely to be named either secretary of energy or director of the Office of Management and Budget.

California attorney William French Smith, who headed Reagan's committee to seek talent for the top government posts, probably could be attorney general if he wants the job, Reagan aides say, but some believe the nomination may go to California Superior Court Judge William Clark. These sources believe Smith, who is Reagan's attorney, may wish to stay in California.

Reagan has decided on more than half the Cabinet nominees, but the names are not being made public until after Reagan and his closest aides have conferred with the president-elect's first choices.

It appears that Reagan is not likely to make public any of his Cabinet selections at least until Friday, when transition director Edwin Meese is scheduled to arrive here for discussions on personnel and policy matters.

Three potential Cabinet choices have asked that their names be removed from consideration. They are William E. Simon, George Shultz and Anne Armstrong.

Until the Cabinet offices are chosen, there are not likely to be any final decisions on the sub-cabinet positions because Reagan wants the new cabinet members to have a voice in choosing the assistants and deputies with whom they will be working.

Reagan is to fly east Monday for several days, first to New York and then to Washington. Reagan advisers believe most of the Cabinet will have been made public by the time Reagan completes his second post-election Washington visit Dec. 13.

ARTICLE REPRODUCED
ON PAGE 1

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
3 December 1980

GOP sources report: **Reagan** **set** **on top** **jobs**

By JAMES WIEGHART and BRUCE DRAKE

Washington (News Bureau)—President-elect Reagan has decided on his administration's top cabinet posts, settling on Alexander Haig as secretary of state, Caspar Weinberger as defense secretary and Citicorp chairman Walter Wriston as treasury secretary, Republican sources said today.

William French Smith, Reagan's longtime personal lawyer, will reportedly become attorney general.

Sources said that Reagan has decided to appoint campaign director William Casey, a prominent New York lawyer and onetime head of the Securities and Exchange Commission, to the top job at the Central Intelligence Agency and University of California

economist Thomas Sowell, a black, to the post of secretary of housing and urban development.

* * * * *

Casey, 67, the choice to head the CIA, went to night law school at St. John's in New York and during World War II entered the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the CIA, where he became chief of secret intelligence for the European war theater. Casey had also been mentioned as a candidate for secretary of state. ■

EXCERPTED

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AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
1 December 1980

Washington Roundup

(Intelligence Team)

President-elect Ronald Reagan's intelligence transition team has a new leader—J. William Middendorf, former Navy secretary and now a Washington investment banker. Middendorf replaces another banker, Laurence H. Silberman, who resigned during squabbles among Republican factions involved in the transition. The intelligence transition team deputy is retired Army Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny, former Joint Chiefs of Staff representative to the SALT negotiations. Team members include Mark Schneider, Kenneth DeGraffenreid and Angelo Codevilla, all members of the Senate Intelligence Committee staff, and George Carver, a former CIA official now with the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Another CSIS official, Ray S. Cline, is a senior intelligence team adviser along with retired Army Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, former deputy director for Central Intelligence.

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HUMAN EVENTS
29 NOVEMBER 1980

Capital Briefs

★ CIA Director Stansfield Turner has failed in a concerted campaign to hold on to his job in the new Administration. Turner, whose rule has shattered morale at the agency, lobbied strenuously to keep his post. But Reagan decided early to bring in a new team at the agency. His reported choice to succeed Turner, campaign chief William Casey, despite his experience in the field, was not the favorite of some intelligence professionals, however. They would have preferred Vice Adm. Bobby R. Inman, head of the National Security Administration, or former Ambassador Laurence Silberman.

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HUMAN EVENTS
6 December 1980

Capital Briefs

★ Conservatives planning the restoration of the Central Intelligence Agency were shocked when CIA legislative counsel, Fred Hitz, who had cultivated a reputation as a hardliner, conspired with both leftist and unsophisticated senior staffers of the Senate Intelligence Committee in a vain attempt to get three pro-Intelligence members of Reagan's CIA transition team fired from their Senate jobs.

★ Taken together with FBI Director William Webster's defense of the Levi guidelines that hinder FBI counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism (see cover) and the denial of FY1982 budget information on intelligence to the appropriate transition teams, the incident at CIA is seen as an attempt to prevent President-elect Reagan from carrying out his campaign pledge to repair the damage done to our intelligence agencies during the last decade.

EXCERPTED

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 29.NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
3 December 1980

The Right to Know? No.

The Right to Listen? Yes.

LEARNED PEOPLE have their own superstitions. One is that the great Thomas Aquinas used to worry over how many angels could dance on the head of a pin. Aquinas did, in fact, ask whether intelligence itself has a kind of Euclidean place, "punctum," to keep it separate from other intelligences. This has nothing to do with physical place—e.g., the point of a pin; in fact, it could have nothing to do with that.



**GARRY
WILLS**

But the technical discussions of serious men often look, from the outside, like mere quibbling. People unable to get the point confidently say that the point is not worth getting.

That may be some readers' reaction to a fascinating treatment, in

The New York Review of Books, of the Frank Snepp case by Ronald Dworkin, the Oxford law professor—a treatment that turns on a crucial difference between the right to know and the right to listen. We

hear a great deal about the first "right," which—according to Dworkin—does not exist. We never hear of the second right, which was the whole point of the Snepp case.

Frank Snepp is the ex-CIA author whose book proceeds were confiscated by the Supreme Court because he did not submit the manuscript to the

***Ex-CIA agent Snepp can't
waive this right. It doesn't
belong to him. It belongs to us.***

agency for prior clearance. The argument of the government was that Snepp made a contract when he entered the CIA, one that waived his constitutional right of free speech so far as CIA information was concerned.

Now, one can waive one's own rights; but can one waive those of other people? Dworkin says the strongest case of Snepp lies in the right of American citizens to listen to things which may affect their participation in the democratic procedure. Without this right to listen, the right to free speech is nugatory.

As Dworkin writes: "Free speech is essential to equal participation, but so is the right of each citizen that others, whose access to information may be superior to his, not be prevented from speaking to him." Snepp could not waive this right in others; it never belonged to him.

The right to free speech does not derive from the worth of what is being said, but from the free will of the person saying it. The same is true of the right to listen. That is one reason Dworkin distinguishes it from a supposed right to know. That would be the equivalent of the old theological "right to speak the truth"—which silenced any people the authorities might declare heretics. How does one sue to protect the right to know, unless one knows what it is one does not know? And are the putatively withheld words really knowledge? That way lies a quagmire.

But the right to hear is, like the right to speak, comparatively simple to establish, aside from the content of what is said or heard. That is the political right implied in the First Amendment, one belonging to every citizen. It is that right the CIA attacks, not only in Frank Snepp, but in all of us.

How many snoops can dance on the point of a distinction? Not many, according to professor Dworkin.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 19CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
3 December 1980

An ex-spook's case for strengthening the CIA

Facing Reality, by Cord Meyer. New York: Harper & Row. \$15.95.

By Arnold Beichman

During the past 15 years, we have become so accustomed to startling exposés written by former Central Intelligence Agency employees that we might call this the era of Books by Spooks.

Naturally, as I started to read this volume by Cord Meyer, who after becoming a newspaper columnist worked 26 years for the CIA until resigning in 1977, I expected juicy disclosures. After all, Meyer had headed the agency's covert action section and was involved in many of its most secret operations.

Well, sad to say, there are no disclosures — between the confessions of ex-CIA officers and the revelations by congressional investigators, there might be nothing left to disclose. In fact, never before have a country's intelligence activities been so opened to public scrutiny, and this very openness raises serious questions as to how a democracy can square its need for efficient intelligence gathering with its desire for a large group of spy-agency overseers who share all the secrets. (As of today, although the next Congress may alter the legislative arrangement, eight congressional committees and their staffs — some 200 persons — oversee CIA policies and activities).

Without telling secrets then, Meyer's autobiography follows a precept laid down by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who recognized it is sometimes more important to emphasize the obvious than to elucidate the obscure. Thus Meyer focuses on why he believes the CIA must be strengthened to meet US security requirements.

The Soviets, Meyer reminds us, use proxy armies (the Cubans in Angola), engage in direct aggression (from Hungary to Czechoslovakia to Afghanistan), and have the will and

capacity for massive covert interventions anywhere in the world. As an esurient world power, the USSR maintains unchanged three interconnected foreign policy priorities: to defend and expand the "socialist order"; to strengthen ties with new governments and revolutionary "progressive" movements; and to pursue with the West its self-defined policy of "peaceful coexistence, détente and international trade."

The danger to the West arises, says Meyer, from the Soviet strategic superiority "that is certain to emerge in the early 1980s." It is not, however, that "the Soviets will seek to gamble everything on one final throw of the nuclear dice."

"The real danger," writes Meyer, "is that under the umbrella of their strategic strength, the Soviets will be tempted to probe continuously for weak points in Western defenses and to engage in an increasingly aggressive exploitation of targets of opportunity in the continuing struggle for allies, strategic bases, and raw materials, secure in the knowledge that at no point will a strategically inferior United States dare to risk an escalation to nuclear war."

The superiority which the USSR enjoys also extends to intelligence, to judge by Meyer's description of the KGB and its estimated force of 400,000 employees, including border guards. Of immeasurable aid to the KGB is not merely this enormous force but America's own democratic system.

"This difference between the open American society," writes Meyer, "and the closed Soviet state forces the American taxpayers to pay billions to finance the collection of the kind of information in the Soviet Union that is freely available to the Soviet Embassy in Washington."

Arnold Beichman is a political scientist and a founding member of the Consortium on the Study of Intelligence.

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
3 DECEMBER 1980

Soviet Union sees slower growth rate

By Marc Rosenwasser
Associated Press

MOSCOW — The Soviet Union yesterday published a new five-year economic plan that projects a slower rate of industrial growth than any recent plan and targets oil production for 1985 at the level originally set for this year.

The draft plan issued by the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee also anticipates a 10 to 15 percent increase in meat production — a relatively small increase that corresponds to projected increases in the grain harvest.

The new plan calls for average grain yields of 238 million to 242 million metric tons per year in 1981-85, a figure many Western analysts consider beyond reach. The record grain crop of 1978 was 237.4 million metric tons. (A metric ton contains 2,204 pounds.)

Last month, Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev told the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet parliament, that "improvement of food supply comes first among the questions on which the living standards of the Soviet people depend."

Soviet per-capita meat consumption is about 60 percent of that in the United States.

Oil production increased during the five-year plan that will end on Dec. 31. It apparently will top 600 million metric tons (12.2 million barrels) a day this year for the first time.

But the 1985 target of 620 million to 645 million metric tons was virtually the same as the targets set in 1975 for 1980. Then, the target was set at 620 million to 640 million metric tons, but production fell short.

The new targets raised the possibility that Western intelligence predictions that Soviet oil production was leveling off, while not precise, may have been generally correct.

In 1977, the CIA said Soviet oil production had peaked at less than 12 million barrels a day and would drop to between 8 million and 10 million barrels a day by 1985. If the Soviets meet the 1985 targets, they will produce between 12.4 million and 12.9 million barrels a day.

But despite the projected increase in production, the growth rate sought for oil production in the new plan was only between 3 percent and 7 percent, compared to an increase of nearly 50 percent projected for the 1975-80 plan.

One reason for the less ambitious plan this time may be that most of the Soviet Union's increased oil production in the next five years will come from Western Siberia, where permafrost, extreme cold and lack of transportation facilities make production difficult and unpredictable.

The growth of industrial output also is set at a lower figure than in years past, though it is still expected, according to the Soviets, to average between 5 and 6 percent a year.

Production during 1976-80 was to have grown by 35 percent over the five-year period, but Soviet statistics indicate actual growth was closer to 25 percent for the period.

The output of consumer goods-related industries is to rise in the next five years by a slightly faster pace than heavy industry.

That is in contrast to the traditional Soviet emphasis on heavy industry but in line with Brezhnev's recent statement that improvements in the production of consumer goods is "of paramount economic and political importance."

The 1981-85 plan, which will be submitted to nationwide discussion and the approved with amendments at the 26th Communist Party Congress in February, also targeted:

- Natural gas production of between 600 billion and 640 billion cubic meters in 1985 compared to production of about 430 billion cubic meters this year. Energy experts say the Soviets hope to use natural gas in many industries that previously used oil and plan on natural gas exports to bring in hard currency previously earned through oil exports.

- Coal production totaling 770 million to 800 million metric tons in 1985. The 1980 plan called for 745 million tons.

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ON PAGE A-9

NEW YORK TIMES
2 DECEMBER 1980

MOSCOW PROJECTING OIL GROWTH BY 1985

New Five-Year Plan Calls for Slight
Gain Instead of the Downturn

Anticipated by the C.I.A.

By ANTHONY AUSTIN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Tuesday, Dec. 2 — The Soviet Union disclosed early today the first goals for its new five-year plan running from 1981 to 1985. The plan calls for an increase in industrial growth, but only a slight rise in the production of oil or of such staples as grain and meat.

The figures, to be approved by the 28th congress of the Communist Party opening in late February, confirmed earlier indications of an economic slowdown.

Overall industrial output is scheduled to rise by 26 to 28 percent over the next five years, averaging 5 to 5.6 percent annually. This would mean a decline from the growth of 6.3 percent a year planned for current five-year period of 1976-80. Actual growth has not measured up to the plan, averaging 4.7 percent a year.

The 1985 goal for oil production in the draft plan has been set at 620 million to 645 million tons. The original range projected under the current plan for 1980 was 620 million to 640 million tons, and the 1980 plan was then set at the upper limit.

610 Million Ton Goal Set for '81

But actual output this year is barely expected to reach 606 million tons, and a goal of 610 million has been set for 1981, the first year of the new five-year plan.

The new plan thus confirms earlier predictions of a leveling off of oil production, but does not support estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency that oil output would start declining by the mid-1980's.

The plan calls for the livestock industry to produce 17 to 17.5 million tons of meat a year. That would not be much of an improvement over current levels, which leave the populace short of meat. Meat production this year is expected to be around 15 million tons.

As for grain production, the new plan calls for an annual harvest of 238 million to 243 million tons. That is not much above the original goal of 235 million tons for the current year. The actual crop this year was 179 million tons.

Compensating for the predicted stagnation in oil production, is the goal for natural gas. The new plan calls for production to rise from the 1980 figure of 439 billion cubic meters to a projected range of 600 billion to 640 billion meters by 1985.

This conforms to expectations among Western specialists that oil exports to Western Europe, now the principal earner of foreign currency for the Soviet Union, will be gradually replaced by exports of natural gas.

National income, a measure of the overall economy similar to gross national product, is to rise by 18 to 20 percent.

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ON PAGE 10

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
1 December 1980

Third world expands steel production as market shrinks

By Reuters

London

In the struggle to industrialize, many developing countries are ambitiously expanding their steel output, threatening more competition and overproduction in an already hard-pressed world industry.

For most of the past decade, the established steel industries of Western Europe and the United States have been grappling with the problems of out-of-date plants and stagnating demand because of poor economic growth.

But in the same period developing countries have been pressing ahead with plans for their own steel industries, which they see as the key to industrial progress.

Last year developing countries, excluding China, produced 56 million tons of steel, according to the International Iron and Steel Institute (IISI) in Brussels. By 1985, that output will double to around 110 or 115 million tons, the US Central Intelligence Agency has forecast.

In the same period, world demand may rise only slowly, many economists believe.

The result could be serious overcapacity in steel production, despite efforts by industrialized countries to reduce output, some industry experts fear. This would hit both rich and poor producers.

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ON PAGE 41

THE WASHINGTON POST
4 December 1980

Carter Voices 'Growing Concern' On Soviet Buildup Near Poland

By Don Oberdorfer
and Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writers

President Carter, raising this country's "growing concern" to the highest governmental level, declared yesterday that Soviet military intervention in Poland would have "most negative consequences" for East-West relations.

"I want all countries to know that the attitude and future policies of the United States toward the Soviet Union would be directly and very adversely affected by any Soviet use of force in Poland," said a written statement issued in Carter's name by the White House.

Senior officials said this second White House statement in two days was not prompted by any fresh intelligence on the possibility of a Soviet invasion, and a senior White House official told reporters that such a Soviet move "need not be imminent or inevitable."

Nevertheless, yesterday's statement was more suggestive of an invasion than were previous U.S. public utterances, including remarks 24 hours earlier by White House press secretary Jody Powell. The latest statement spoke of growing U.S. concern about "the unprecedented buildup of Soviet forces along the Polish border and the closing of certain frontier regions along the border." It also spoke of Soviet charges of "anti-socialist" forces within

Poland, the sort of allegation that in the past sometimes preceded military intervention.

Though unmentioned in the presidential statement, U.S. intelligence is reliably reported to be watching such developments as the grounding of most of Moscow's fleet of long-range transport aircraft throughout Eastern Europe. Though this could be due to bad weather, sources noted that in the past the planes have been kept in readiness on the ground before military operations.

Among the other indications that are of concern, according to U.S. sources, are a number of small-unit military exercises by Soviet and East German troops in East Germany; and a Soviet air defense exercise reportedly about to begin along the Polish-East German border. Western military observers have been barred from the latter area.

Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie, speaking to reporters several hours before the Carter statement was issued, said there is "no evidence that a decision has been made" in Moscow regarding intervention in Poland.

Moskie provided more details than previously were available of the sorts of major consequences the United States envisions if the Soviets decide to intervene. Among these, as recounted by the secretary of state, are:

- The "serious" possibility of Polish resistance, which would embroil Soviet military forces in a new large-scale struggle.

- Additional Soviet military costs to be "taken out of the hides of the Soviet people."

- A "tremendous escalation" of U.S. and West European military expenditures.

- The spoiling of Soviet detente with Western European countries, with such economic effects as the undermining of the large-scale natural gas pipeline in prospect between Siberia and Western Europe.

- The destruction of what prospects remain for a new strategic arms limitation treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States.

- The destruction of the Helsinki accords of 1975, which included a long-sought recognition by the West of the Soviet role in Eastern Europe.

Asked if the United States would rule out the use of its own military forces in the event of a Soviet invasion of Poland, Muskie replied: "We ought to leave the Russians in doubt, I would think."

There was no indication from official sources, however, that the United States is contemplating a military response should the Soviets intervene, and there was widespread doubt that any U.S. or Western military action would be effective.

Because of the history and temperament of the Polish people and the intense popularity of the trade union movement that has been the spearhead of the call for change within the country, the consensus of U.S. officials is that a Soviet invasion there would meet much more serious resistance than was the case in the earlier interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

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A major imponderable, particularly in view of the announcements last night by the political and military leadership of the Polish Communist Party, is the extent to which Soviet military pressure outside the country's borders could contribute to a climate which could bring about internal suppression of the union movement without a Russian invasion.

According to U.S. sources, the Soviets continue to conduct communications exercises in Poland, East Germany and the nearby portions of the U.S.S.R. in which they practice the procedures that would be followed in case of actual intervention. Knowledge of these activities can exert psychological pressure within Poland, as well as contributing to Soviet readiness in case of need.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1THE BALTIMORE SUN
4 December 1980

Poland facing serious crisis, leaders warn

Carter warning Party appeal

By Henry Trehwitt
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—With Soviet military preparations increasing, President Carter led a chorus of warnings yesterday that an invasion of Poland would have "most negative consequences."

Estimates of Soviet intentions varied. Some officials thought bloody suppression of Poland's independent labor movement was imminent; others that current Soviet military measures amounted to an ominous warning for the future.

Mr. Carter's warning, the sharpest yet from Washington, was issued late yesterday after the president was briefed by Adm. Stansfield Turner, the director of central intelligence, on the state of Soviet readiness. The statement had, moreover, the implicit endorsement of President-elect Reagan.

The administration used great care in formulating its reaction yesterday. In several briefings, high officials framed the U.S. position in a way calculated to emphasize the enormity of the consequences of a Soviet invasion without raising threats.

Whether a concerted Western response could be arranged appeared uncertain. One adviser to President Carter said the series of warnings from both the United States and Europe resulted from consultations, but without a clear definition of all measures to be taken if the invasion occurs.

The outgoing and incoming administrations came close to a declaration of common policy, although they have been careful to honor the truism that only Mr. Carter can govern until January 20.

Richard V. Allen, Mr. Reagan's chief foreign policy adviser, said yesterday that he had talked with Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie and that the administration's attitude reflected that of the president-elect.

Mr. Carter and other administration spokesmen were carefully imprecise about the international consequences of Soviet intervention. There was no suggestion that the United States or the West generally would react militarily, though Mr. Muskie remarked that "we ought to leave the Russians in doubt" on that score.

But publicly and privately, officials emphasized that all efforts at detente would be frozen indefinitely and that scores of trade and other agreements between Moscow and the capitalist democracies would collapse. Mr. Muskie judged that an invasion would "pretty well destroy" the five-year-old agreement on security and cooperation in Europe.

That agreement, signed at Helsinki, Finland, in 1975 by 35 nations, committed those nations to orderly relations and to observance of basic human rights. The West has accused the Soviet Union of constant human rights violations almost from the day the document was signed.

Now, Mr. Muskie said yesterday, the Soviet Union must decide whether it is willing to tolerate some degree of liberalization in Poland or endure world opprobrium for suppressing it. The Helsinki agreement, he suggested, still is serving to restrain Soviet actions toward Poland.

Judgments differed about the state of Soviet readiness. Some U.S. analysts said Soviet troops were ready to intervene within a day or so, others that more time would be required.

Mr. Carter's statement was both a warning to the Soviet Union and a disclaimer that the United States is trying to undermine Moscow's acknowledged security interests in Eastern Europe.

The United States, he said, "is watching with growing concern the unprecedented buildup of Soviet forces along the Polish border and the closing of certain frontier regions along the border."

The United States has also taken note of Soviet references to alleged anti-socialist forces within Poland. We know from postwar history that such allegations have sometimes preceded military intervention.

He thus referred to Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, both carried out to prevent weakening of Communist systems loyal to Moscow. In neither case did Soviet troops encounter organized military resistance.

In Poland, U.S. officials are convinced, much of the army as well as the public would resist Soviet troops. "If it happens, it will be a bloody mess," a State Department official said.

The United States, Mr. Carter said, "continues to believe that the Polish people and authorities should be free to work out their internal difficulties without outside interference."

"The United States as well as some Western governments, and also the Soviet Union, have pledged economic assistance to Poland in order to alleviate internal Polish difficulties. The United States has no interest in exploiting in any fashion the Polish difficulties for its political ends."

"Foreign military intervention in Poland would have most negative consequences for East-West relations in general and U.S.-Soviet relations in particular. We want all countries to know that the attitude and future policies of the United States toward the Soviet Union would be directly and very adversely affected by any Soviet use of force in Poland."

Tension has been rising in Poland, with occasional periods of calm, since August, when three weeks of strikes forced the Polish government to authorize creation of Solidarity, an independent labor federation. In the American analysis, Solidarity's activity clearly implies a long-term political challenge to control by the Communist Party.

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And that challenge, in turn, is judged here to be unacceptable to the Soviet Union. What no one here assesses with certainty is the point at which Soviet patience runs out in favor of military action.

Poland's Communist Party purged four members of its Politburo Tuesday in the fourth reorganization since August. The latest shuffle is interpreted here as an effort by Stanislaw Kania, the first secretary of the party, to consolidate his power.

Trying to judge Soviet perspectives from a distance, U.S. officials believe that Soviet leaders are torn between alternatives. On the one hand, the Americans say, the Kremlin worries that the Polish infection could spread to other client states in Eastern Europe. On the other, the international cost of invasion, even at nonmilitary levels, would be enormous.

Soviet troops still are having difficulty in consolidating their year-old invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union needs Western foodstuffs, technology and credit.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 December 1980

Will Soviet troops at border force Polish compromise?

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington
Are Soviet divisions now massed along the Polish border for an invasion? Or will the threat of military action force Poland's labor radicals to compromise and forestall an attack?

Official Washington, while hoping for compromise, feels that Poland is moving toward greater instability — and an eventual invasion by those Soviet troops.

Washington's apprehension lies behind the blunt warnings issued to the Soviet Union in recent days by spokesmen both for the Carter administration and for President-elect Ronald Reagan.

What convinces US officials that those troops might eventually be used against Poland is a growing conviction that the Polish labor movement is rolling out of control.

At the State Department, analysts foresee a fairly rapid process of "destabilization" in Poland. The number of "pessimists" predicting an eventual invasion has grown. Said one State Department official: "Certainly the momentum of events is in the direction of greater instability."

At the Pentagon, a number of Defense Department analysts are saying that a Soviet invasion is a "probability" and that it could take place within a matter of weeks. Intelligence analysts are reported to support this conclusion.

But most analysts caution that the Soviets could be using their reported troop maneuvers, at this stage at least, for impact short of an invasion.

"They might be trying to send warning signals to the Poles," said a State Department official. "They might be trying to scare the labor radicals and stiffen the backbone of the government. . . . At the same time, they may be readying themselves for potential requirements."

Militating against a Soviet invasion are a number of factors. To start with, as one American defense analyst points out, Polish resistance to any invasion could be expected to be "substantial and protracted." Some Polish army units would be expected to turn against the Russians while others remained neutral.

The Poles have a long history of underground resistance to outsiders. Teenagers who fought Warsaw street battles against the Nazis now are men in their 50s, still capable of leading a fight.

Poland, everyone agrees, would be a much tougher nut to crack for the Soviets than was Czechoslovakia in 1968. In addition to its proud history of resistance, Poland has more than twice the population of Czechoslovakia.

An invasion could mean the end of East-West détente and, of course, East-West trade for some considerable time to come. And given Poland's food shortages and sizable debts to the West, the Soviets would be taking on an enormous economic and financial burden in Poland. This they would be assuming at the very time when the Soviets themselves are suffering from new shortages and economic stresses.

Not everyone thinks a Soviet invasion is inevitable. Jane Curry, a specialist on Poland at Columbia University, points out that the Polish workers have carefully tailored many of their actions to stay within certain bounds. She also notes that within Poland itself there seems to be less apprehension about an invasion than there is in the West.

"In the end, I think the Soviets will hold off," said Professor Curry. "But they're going to do a lot of saber rattling."

Professor Curry sees the recent leadership changes in Poland as an indication that the Polish government is going to continue with a "tightrope policy" of trying on the one hand to offer a degree of compromise to the workers, while on the other trying to maintain control and reassure the Russians.

A problem arises, she says, because the workers want to develop political institutions to protect their economic gains. In the past, she continues, the workers made gains but then saw them disappear because of a lack of institutional change. The government, however, must make certain that there is no challenge to continued communist party rule. Polish foreign policy and controls over the press.

Professor Curry thinks that much of the pressure on the Soviets in favor of an invasion is probably coming from Poland's neighbors, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The leaders of those countries apparently fear that should the Polish workers hold on to their gains, liberalizing influences will spread beyond Poland's borders to the other East European nations.

An invasion would probably involve the use of Czech and East German troops, just as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia involved the use of other East European armies — aside from that of Romania.

Defense analysts do not like to speculate about the number of troops which it would take to suppress Poland, because the nature of the resistance remains unpredictable. But one estimate has it that at least 30 divisions of troops would be required. With all the support units involved, this would come to more than half a million men. Some other estimates of what it would take run even higher.

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WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
3 DECEMBER 1980

Polish Border Moves Worry U.S.

Carter-Reagan Aides Warn Soviet Leaders

By Walter Taylor
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Soviet Union has increased military activity along Poland's eastern and western borders, actions that U.S. intelligence analysts believe are designed to enhance Russian capability to intervene if Polish labor unrest continues.

U.S. officials monitoring the activity — described as troop movements along Poland's border with East Germany and increased communications between Soviet field units and the military command in Moscow — do not believe the actions necessarily presage a Russian invasion.

Rather, they said, the movements at this point may merely be the latest chapter in the five-month Soviet effort to intimidate the new national labor union in Poland, Solidarity, into a more submissive posture.

Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie told reporters at the State Department yesterday that the Soviets seem to realize military intervention could be costly in their relationship with the West.

"I am quite aware that the Soviets have been impressed by the heavy costs of that kind of action on their part, and I'm sure they are going to seek to avoid such costs," Muskie said.

The Carter administration, however, is sufficiently concerned to have called in Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin earlier this week to inquire about Russian intentions.

State Department spokesman John H. Trattner said the unscheduled meeting was held Monday between Dobrynin and David D. Newsom, the undersecretary for political affairs. Newsom, the No. 3 man in the department, was acting on behalf of Muskie, who was in Mexico, Trattner said.

Details of the discussion, which was said also to have touched on the border confrontation between Jordan and Syria, were not disclosed.

U.S. intelligence reports on military activity on the Polish borders also prompted tough public warnings yesterday from White House press secretary Jody Powell and from President-elect Ronald Reagan's chief national security adviser, Richard V. Allen.

At the same time, the heads of state and governments of the nine-nation European Common Market issued their own statement in Luxembourg, asserting that a Soviet invasion of Poland could mean an end to detente.

Powell, speaking to reporters at the White House late yesterday, said "it would be a mistake for any foreign government to assume that in a period of transition between governments here, the Americans lack either the will or the ability to respond appropriately" to an invasion of Poland.

Powell did not elaborate except to say that President Carter had been in touch with allied leaders on the Polish crisis.

In a television interview earlier, Allen, who is considered a strong possibility to head the National Security Council in the Reagan administration, said that the consequences of Russian interference in Poland on East-West relations would be severe and long-lasting.

The statements and the conference with Dobrynin all were prompted, U.S. officials said, by intelligence reports from the Polish border areas, strong statements in the government-controlled Russian press about the Polish situation, and, most recently, formal notification by the Soviets that a 60-mile-wide swath along the entire boundary between Poland and East Germany was being closed to Western military observers.

U.S. officials said the Russians specified that the area, normally open to Westerners under terms of post-World War treaties, would be closed at least through Dec. 9 to permit "air defense exercises."

Defense Department analysts tended to give some credence to the stated Soviet reason for closing the border, noting that there appeared to be nearly normal civilian activity within the security area. Commercial traffic on three major highways between Germany and Poland also seemed normal, these officials said.

The Russian press warnings came Sunday when major newspapers and Tass, the official Soviet news agency, all reprinted an article indirectly invoking what the West has dubbed the "Brezhnev Doctrine": a threat to the system of any Communist nation is a threat to all members of the Soviet bloc.

The article warned that other Eastern bloc states could take action similar to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia to save Polish communism from "counterrevolution."

U.S. officials were reluctant to divulge the precise nature of their intelligence reports, partly out of concern for protecting or disguising American information sources.

They said, however, that within the past two or three days, Soviet military "readiness" has been increased on both Poland's East German and Soviet borders.

The officials said the activity involved movements of forces already in the border regions rather than new troop buildups, and probably fell short of "alert" status. There was some activity within the Soviet Union itself, they said, but most of the major troop movements were taking place in East Germany and involved both German and Russian soldiers.

Western analysts believe there are as many as 400,000 Russian troops in East Germany, and more than 200,000 more in the Soviet military district closest to the Russian-Polish border. Poland has combined armed services numbering about 317,000 men.

One U.S. analyst closely involved in monitoring the situation said it still is considered unlikely that a Russian move into Poland is imminent.

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ON PAGE 17

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
8 December 1980

Washington Whispers

If the Kremlin forces Poland's Communist chief Stanislaw Kania out of office, European intelligence officials say, it would be a tip-off that the Soviets plan a military move into Poland. The Russians, these experts explain, would want a puppet leader in Poland in the hope of minimizing resistance.

★ ★ ★

Continuing reports of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's ailing health have touched off renewed speculation about his possible successor. Best estimate by Western intelligence sources at this point: Brezhnev's two jobs would be split, in a temporary arrangement, between Andrei Kirilenko, a 74-year-old Politburo member who would become head of the Communist Party, and Vasily Kuznetsov, 79—holder of a master's degree from Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh—who would move up from Vice President to President of the Soviet Union.

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4PM-REAGAN-FOREIGN:320

4PRESIDENT-ELECT RECEIVING BRIEFINGS ON POLISH UNREST

4BY ROBERT FURLOW

4ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

WASHINGTON (AP) - PRESIDENT-ELECT RONALD REAGAN IS RECEIVING DAILY CIA BRIEFINGS ON WHAT HE AND TOP AIDES CONSIDER "THE POTENTIAL WORLD DANGER" OF LABOR UNREST IN POLAND; A TOP REAGAN ASSOCIATE SAID TODAY.

"WE ARE UP TO DATE ON THE SITUATION," EDWIN MEESE III, COUNSELOR TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT, TOLD REPORTERS AT A NEWS CONFERENCE.

"AS FAR AS ANY COMMENTS ON WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE, IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR US TO SAY UNTIL AFTER THE 20TH OF JANUARY," HE SAID. REAGAN TAKES OFFICE THAT DAY.

EARLIER TODAY, THE POLISH GOVERNMENT RUSHED A DELEGATION TO GDANSK TO CONFER WITH LEADERS OF THE BIGGEST INDEPENDENT TRADE UNION AS A NEW LABOR CRISIS THREATENED OVER THE ARREST OF AN UNION WORKER.

POLISH NEWSPAPERS, MEANWHILE, QUOTED COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER STANISLAW KANIA AS EXPRESSING CONCERN AT THE "MANIPULATION OF THE WEAPON OF STRIKES," WHICH JEOPARDIZES "THE OBLIGATIONS RESULTING FROM OUR ALLIANCES" - A REFERENCE TO THE SOVIET-LED WARSAW PACT.

AS FOR THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF, MEESE SAID SEN. CHARLES PERCY, R-ILL, CARRIED "NO MESSAGES OTHER THAN THE SOCIAL IDEA OF GOOD WISHES" FROM REAGAN WHEN THE SENATOR MET SOVIET PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV EARLIER TODAY.

HOWEVER, MEESE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PERCY, WHO IS IN LINE TO BECOME CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE NEXT YEAR, MET WITH REAGAN FOREIGN POLICY AIDES BEFORE HIS TRIP TO MOSCOW AND "WILL BE ABLE TO GENERALLY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT" ON FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS.

DESPITE THAT CONTACT - AND REAGAN'S BRIEF MEETING WITH WEST GERMAN CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT LAST WEEK IN WASHINGTON - MEESE SAID REAGAN IS STICKING TO HIS PLEDGE AGAINST OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH FOREIGN LEADERS BEFORE HIS INAUGURATION.

MEESE SAID REAGAN AND A FEW AIDES ARE ALSO BEING BRIEFED DAILY ON OTHER FOREIGN MATTERS, INCLUDING THE HOSTAGE SITUATION IN IRAN, BUT HE REFUSED TO COMMENT FURTHER.

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JACK ANDERSON COLUMNS

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THE WASHINGTON POST
3 December 1980

JACK ANDERSON

SHHHH! — However well the Central Intelligence Agency is doing in gathering information, it is far from enthusiastic about releasing it, according to congressional sources. The CIA has one of the biggest backlogs of requests under the Freedom of Information Act of any governmental agency. In fact, the critics complain, the only government bureau that comes close to the CIA's institutional reticence is the FBI. The only mystifying aspect of all this is why the people on Capitol Hill should think this is mystifying.

EXCERPT

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE R15THE WASHINGTON POST
2 December 1980**JACK ANDERSON**

Project Aquarium: Tapping the Tappers

The secret tapping of the telephones of innocent Americans supposedly came to a crashing halt with reform legislation which was enacted five years ago. But it didn't.

A loophole in the law, designed to give the Good Guys a break in the continuous game of espionage with the Russians, permits Uncle Sam's spooks to listen in on any phone conversations the Kremlin's agents have tapped.

As a result, thousands of phone calls to and from government officials, businessmen and other Americans have been clandestinely recorded by both U.S. and Soviet snoopers. And thanks to the loophole, this eavesdropping—by the American tappers, that is—was perfectly legal.

It was also totally unproductive.

The operation, code-named "Project Aquarium," has been traced to the early days of the Carter administration, intelligence sources told my associate Dale Van Atta. And one of the unwitting targets was President Carter's good friend and attorney general, Griffin Bell.

For reasons that make sense to the convoluted reasoning of the espionage community, the government has done little to stop the Russians' electronic monitoring of phone calls in this country. Since 1977, the bugging has been done from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the Russian consulate in San Francisco, two of their offices

in New York and several other secret locations.

The CIA wanted to crack the New York operation. The reason is that two-thirds of all long-distance calls travel by microwaves, and much of that traffic is beamed through transmitting towers in New York. The Russians simply rent a hotel room and tap into one of the towers with sophisticated equipment.

They use a scanning device to zero in on the few hundred phone numbers they're interested in—government officials privy to state secrets, business executives discussing confidential matters, perhaps the mistress of an important man who would then be susceptible to blackmail.

Unfortunately, the CIA just didn't have the electronic expertise to horn in on the Russian snoopers. After trying for months with no success, they finally turned to the National Security Agency for help.

For the NSA—which once, in "Project Canute," reconstructed messages from the acoustical tape of someone typing—the monitoring was like shooting fish in a barrel. Within a week the agency's wizards were tapping the Russians' radio monitors and hearing everything they heard.

One early result was a surprise: The NSA tapped the Soviets tapping Attorney General Bell, who was overheard discussing classified information on an unsecured line. Bell was

quickly informed, though the leak was "more of a joke than a serious thing," in Bell's words.

Thousands of phone calls by hundreds of individuals were subjected to Project Aquarium's double U.S.-Soviet eavesdropping, long after the furor over Watergate-era domestic surveillance had subsided. But intelligence sources say the project never turned up so much as a nugget of significant information.

The most the NSA monitors learned were the identities of Americans who excite the Russians' interest—which in most cases is obvious. "I've never seen the need for that kind of intelligence," said one CIA official. "It's wasted."

Footnote: To its credit, the NSA resisted Bell's efforts to get hold of its tapes. He particularly wanted any that might have shed some light on the Koreagate scandal. In a showdown at the White House, the president ordered the NSA director to inform Bell if any of the taped conversations had relevance to the investigation. The director said none did.

But some experts are concerned that the loophole allowing federal tapping of innocent citizens—so long as the Russians tap them first—could be used as a means of returning to the bad old days of indiscriminate domestic snooping that was discredited by the Watergate excesses.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
1 December 1980

JACK ANDERSON

Aeroflot Suspected of Espionage Flights

One American response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which is probably as irritating to the Kremlin as the Olympic Games boycott is the curtailment of U.S. flights by the Russian state airline, Aeroflot.

Since the Afghanistan aggression, Aeroflot has been restricted to two flights a week out of Dulles International Airport, the federally operated facility outside Washington. Aeroflot's flights into New York were halted not by the U.S. government, but by the Teamsters union, which has refused to service Soviet planes there.

What bothers the Russians is not the loss of revenue, but the cutback on espionage activities furthered by Aeroflot. The Soviet planes, with their KGB security personnel, are the Russians' preferred means of getting top-secret reports safely back to the Kremlin.

However, a secret CIA report shown recently to my associate Dale Van Atta discloses that Aeroflot is more than merely a secure delivery channel for Russian spy material.

"For a number of years," the report states, "the Soviets have been suspected of using Aeroflot for (electronic) intelligence collection operations." Two examples are cited:

• "The Soviets reportedly rescheduled the flight of an IL-62 Classic in 1974 to permit coverage of a U.S. command post exercise."

• In 1977, a special Aeroflot charter

flight over the continental United States "was viewed as having a collection mission, since signal intelligence intercept gear was observed on the aircraft."

These examples, the report says, "indicate a prolonged employment of Aeroflot by the Soviets for both counterintelligence and foreign collection purposes."

All over the world, Aeroflot is regarded with suspicion by local governments. The airline's chief of operations in the Netherlands was arrested some years ago and expelled on suspicion of trying to steal state secrets. And the CIA reports that on another occasion "a high-level Aeroflot official in Madrid was expelled by Spanish authorities as a result of his involvement in military espionage."

Within the Soviet Union, the security police apparently judge foreigners by what the Russians do when they're abroad. "On domestic flights over the USSR, the KGB officer probably acts in a security capacity to inform on the activities of foreigners or to block attempts by them to gather intelligence," the CIA reports. "On overseas flights, the function of the KGB officer would be to maintain control over the flight crew and prevent any possible defections."

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THE WASHINGTON POST
PARADE MAGAZINE
30 November 1980

Why I Tell Secrets

by Jack Anderson

As a confessed muckraker, I hold no security clearance. Most government officials, if possible, avoid me. The mere mention of my name has caused them to shut their doors and lock their files. Yet I am privy to some of the most sensitive information in their security vaults. I have regular access to documents so secret that the classification stamps are themselves classified.

PARADE has asked me why I seek out the secrets of government. There are, I believe, sufficient reasons. But first a word of orientation.

One of the seemingly irreversible currents I have observed during 32 years of covering Washington politics is the hankering of our leaders to transform themselves from servants into sovereigns, to replace Abraham Lincoln's "government of the people, by the people and for the people" with a government of privilege, majesty and omnipotence.

There is still an occasional tribune who lives simply in some Washington hostel and goes about his business with a minimum of pomp, presumption and freeloading. But the common practice has been to pursue aggrandizement and usurpation, often with mock humility.

Permeating it all is the aura of pseudo-divinity with which government these days surrounds itself—its denial, whenever it can get away with it, of the right of the citizen to know or of the press to publish; its hostility toward any attempt to hold it to account or question its motives.

At the center is the President with his battalions of courtiers, programmatic lying to the public, seduction of the press. Around the President are grouped the bureaucratic princes, ever more impervious to public control. And ensconced on Capitol Hill are the Congressional barons, continually building their private fiefdoms while surrendering the legitimate powers of the people to the Executive Branch.

Our modern Hohenzollerns reveal themselves most characteristically when a reporter charges the government with deceit or dishonesty, or presumes to give the public news that does not come from palace sources. Then our elected leaders, instead of rushing to correct the abuses, are concerned more with chastening the reporter and exposing the identity of the varlets who squealed.

Most of the information that is funneled into the White House is protectively classified. This leaves the President free to manipulate the news, to release selectively those facts that make him look good. Through his press spokesmen, he controls most of the news that emanates from the White House. Even the leaks are usually orchestrated by his news managers.

I have a duty to report what the government is doing, which is not always what the authorized spokesmen say it is doing. They will say only what the President wants them to say. I have learned to rely, therefore, on unauthorized sources. They are the professional civil servants whom the public never sees. They know what the intelligence reports really show and what the Administration's policies really are. Some are willing to tell the truth, at great risk to themselves, because they believe their first loyalty should be to the citizens who pay them. The information these sources possess—and the documents, mostly classified, they produce to back it up—is often the opposite of the kind of news that is officially leaked or passed out at press conferences or printed in press releases.

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The people in power do not relish having their cozy relationships exposed, their blunders, waste and wrongdoing brought to light. But given our democratic traditions, they cannot properly censor the news—so they simply classify it, using the cloak of official secrecy to cover up their embarrassments.

Yet the President does not hesitate to release classified information if it will win him support. Few military developments were more secret, for example, than the "invisible plane" which can elude enemy radar by absorbing its rays. Technicians had to agree to let the government tap their telephones before they were allowed to work on the project. But President Carter, under fire for letting our military defenses lag, needed a dramatic headline to persuade voters that he had not neglected national security. He got the headline, thanks to some suspiciously opportune leaks about the new technology.

Undesirable leaks are abhorred by the Administration. To stop them, Jimmy Carter required two dozen of his top administrators to sign unprecedented, gratuitous affidavits. But if the leaks benefit the Administration, they are embraced by the abhorers. In the matter of the ghostly flying machine, for example, Defense Secretary Harold Brown not only confirmed the leaks but added triumphant details.

Admittedly, reporters are not security experts, and the publication of military secrets is always a thorny question. What qualifies a lowly reporter to judge whether a bold military venture is bound to end in catastrophe and whether to publish the plan before it becomes a *fait accompli*? Certainly I am not competent to outguess the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But I am in close touch with military experts whom the Joint Chiefs themselves consult. At the risk of appearing immodest, let me briefly review my record:

In 1964, Lyndon Johnson decided to draw a line in Vietnam. But he needed an incident to build national solidarity. The opportunity came when Communist patrol boats, looking for ships that raided the North Vietnamese coast, made a run against American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. No one was hurt; no damage was done. A second dark-of-night "attack" probably never even occurred but was the result of faulty radar. With these dubious ingredients, Johnson created a phony incident and stepped firmly onto one of history's great banana peels.

I reported, citing secret naval documents, that the incident had been contrived. The Senate, nevertheless, gave President Johnson the resolution he sought as a license to expand America's role in a stalemated war from which there was no satisfactory exit.

I tried, with a journalist's presumption, to influence the Vietnam decisions by hoisting a number of alarms based on classified information. But the war turned into a debacle so gloom-laden as to spoil the I-told-you-sos.

During the Richard Nixon regime, I continued to report war news that the President wanted to suppress. I reported in March 1971 that, despite White House assurances that the war was being wound down, the Pentagon had prepared detailed plans for bombing North Vietnam and mining Haiphong harbor. The story did not stop the final frenzy of warfare before the painful American withdrawal.

The following December, I reported that Richard Nixon was secretly supporting Pakistan in the India-Pakistan conflict and that he had ordered a carrier task force under wartime conditions into the battle zone. Top Soviet officials assured Indian leaders that any Chinese intervention would be offset by a Russian attack on China and that any moves by the American task force would be opposed by the Soviet fleet.

It seemed to me that Russia, China and the United States were maneuvering dangerously near the edge of world war. Yet President Nixon never told Congress of the dangers, instead putting out the word that America was keeping hands off. He personally advised the top leaders of the Senate and the House that his only interest was to bring peace. "We are neutral," he said to them. "We are not taking sides." This, I charged, was a lie. My stories hopefully helped to persuade Nixon to back away from this crisis.

The stakes are enormously higher in the Persian Gulf, where the oil price explosion has brought tensions to a boil. Secret documents reveal that the late Shah of Iran was "the dominant force" behind the ruinous price increases. Washington had the leverage to pressure the Shah to join Saudi Arabia in its repeated offers to stop the price leap, yet this was opposed by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who hoped the oil revenue would finance the Shah's arms buildup.

When I broke this story in 1976, an anguished Kissinger requested the right to dispute my evidence. So I showed his aide, William Hyland, a folder full of top-secret documents backing up the allegations. Hyland was aghast: "Someone must have given you the whole computer print-out on this," he said. It was the last I heard from Kissinger on the subject.

With Jimmy Carter in the White House, trying to keep his equilibrium in the Iranian hostage crisis, I reported once again that the President was preparing for military action and that the Soviets had 23 divisions just across Iran's border ready to respond. The White House issued angry denials, though many of the details were later confirmed. My sources believe passionately that the United States doesn't have the military power to force a showdown in the Persian Gulf today, that now is a time to practice delicate diplomacy.

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The way an investigative reporter is compelled to operate, of course, is an imperfect system of news-gathering. Sometimes the sources do not have all the details. Sometimes the jigsaw pieces of information do not form a complete picture and the missing pieces are buried too deeply. Investigative reporters must work without the power of subpoena. They lack the money and manpower that the government can marshal to counter their efforts.

They must also work harder, dig deeper and verify their facts more carefully than reporters who follow the official line. Preposterous lies can be told to make the powerful look good; grievous blunders can be committed by officials in the name of the government; the public can be cheated by men sworn to uphold the public trust. But let an investigative reporter make a mistake, and there are howls of outrage.

From time to time, I have found myself the object of certain discomforting attentions. My house has been under surveillance by men with binoculars sitting in parked cars. The CIA has dispatched radio cars to tail people from my office. A CIA camera crew has taken photographs of visitors at my door; an electronics crew has eavesdropped on my conversations; the FBI has seized records of my telephone calls; tax agents have combed through my financial records; the Pentagon has conducted one investigation of me after another.

Persons within the government suspected of having contact with me have been subjected to phone taps, lie detector tests and other indignities. In their zeal to discover my sources, federal agencies have not balked at violating U.S. law.

We in America have evolved an entire institution to undertake a mission that in a tyranny falls to the solitary genius and hero—to give the people an alternative to the official version of things, a measure by which to judge the efficacy of rulers and whether the truth is in them.

Long ago, the role of the village editor and dissenting pamphleteer—as monitor, critic and rival of the politician—was a fundamental part of the American system. It was of this role that Thomas Jefferson spoke when he declared that if he had to choose between a government without newspapers and newspapers without a government, he would take his morning paper.

Because our country was formed by a scattering of peoples with no common denominator of religion, geography or ethnic origin, American patriotism is grounded in common adherence to a distinct set of ideas. Expounded by Jefferson and popularized further by Lincoln, they concern the rights of the people—to know, to dissent, to be treated equally, to rule themselves, to run their government processes, to be the judges of government and not its subjects. It is this distinctively American ideal that lends nobility to the endeavor of the investigative reporter and raises it above its grubby appearances.

This concept of patriotism is in direct confrontation with the monarchic version we hear every day from on high—namely, that the national interest is embodied in the particular Administration in office, that it is damaged by the disparagement of government leaders and by exposing scandals, acts that create a spirit of cynicism about the government.

This "alien hands off" patriotism preached by government officials will lead only to the eventual collapse of an uncriticized, corrupt shell. But if the American idea is valid, an exposure once in a while can only make the nation stronger—just as the pruning of a rotten branch strengthens a great tree, one that grows not in darkness but in sunlight.

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EL SALVADOR

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ON PAGE **A-19**NEW YORK TIMES
1 DECEMBER 1980

ABROAD AT HOME

Another
Noble
Cause?

By Anthony Lewis

The document says American policy toward Country X has "identified our interests with a relatively weak, unpopular and isolated regime." It argues that "our actions and our words have narrowed down our policy to a single path of gradual escalation of direct military involvement... in a political context that gives the use of force few chances to achieve a satisfactory outcome."

It might be a dissenting document from the early days of American involvement in Vietnam — something written by a C.I.A. analyst in, say, 1964. If such an analysis had appeared in the Pentagon Papers when that history was published in 1971, its gloomy forecast would have been regarded as extraordinarily prescient.

In fact, it is a document dissenting from U.S. policy toward El Salvador today. Now circulating in Washington, it bears no names but is attributed to "current and former officials" of the C.I.A., the State and Defense Departments and the National Security Council. It was first disclosed by a Boston Globe specialist on Latin America, Stephen Kinzer.

El Salvador is a small Central American country, population 4.5 million, of which most North Americans know little — about like Vietnam in the early 1960's. Unlike Vietnam, it is in our back yard; history and geography demand United States concern when El Salvador is in turmoil. And for the last year it has been in bloody turmoil.

On Oct. 15, 1979, reformist army colonels overthrew El Salvador's rightist government. A mixed regime of military men and moderate-left civilians has governed since. It has redistributed land to peasants and nationalized banks. But it has been preoccupied by violence from right and left.

More than 8,000 people have been murdered in El Salvador so far in 1980 — compared with 2,000 in the last 11 years of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland. Most of the victims were shot or bludgeoned to death by right-wing "death squads." Last week gunmen kidnapped left-wing political leaders from a press conference; the next day bodies of six were found, shot after torture. The right has attempted two coups.

On the left, guerrillas have killed not only soldiers and businessmen but

members of the centrist Christian Democratic Party, which is in the government. The guerrillas are believed to be getting help from Nicaragua, and a victory for them would be seen as extending the influence of Fidel Castro's Cuba in Central America.

The Carter Administration, opposed to the guerrillas but concerned about the effects of rightist terror, has followed a middle policy. It strongly supports the El Salvador junta and has condemned the right-wing coup attempts. It has a small military advisory group in the country. But because of human rights violations by the security forces and death squads, Washington has embargoed sales of "lethal" military equipment.

The dissenting document now circulating in Washington argues that the Carter policy will not meet its objectives, which are to limit Cuban and Soviet influence in Central America and promote stable, pluralistic governments. The authors say there is a drift toward U.S. military involvement that will tend to expand the conflict in El Salvador, offend moderate governments in the region and actually serve Soviet and Cuban interests.

"Various U.S. Government agencies," the document says, "have taken preparatory steps to intervene militarily in El Salvador." It says that Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador and Costa Rica, concerned at the trend, are moving away from support of U.S. policy.

The oncoming Reagan Administration has to regard the situation in El Salvador as one of the most threatening it faces. In the last few days members of the leading El Salvador business group, the Productive Alliance, have been in Washington talking to Reagan advisers. They told reporters that the advisers said combat military and financial aid would come quickly from a Reagan Administration, but warned against a rightist military coup.

One of the Reagan advisers, Jean Kirkpatrick of the American Enterprise Institute, said afterward that no policies had been worked out but that the new Administration would try to see that "Castroite guerrillas" do not "take power by force of arms." The existing El Salvador Government, she said, was already of a social democratic type, "profoundly reformist."

The trouble is that the reformist character of the government installed a year ago has faded with the violence. Many now believe it has slipped to the right and protected rightist violence. During last week's kidnapping, 200 men in police and military uniforms surrounded the area. The Government's political appeal, in the country and outside, has declined.

That is what the dissenters see in their critical document. But their solution — that the U.S. work for a "Zimbabwe solution" with the guerrillas — is also highly risky. Hence the danger that Washington, in the early Reagan months, will slip into military escalation in El Salvador.

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ON PAGE 1-14

THE BOSTON GLOBE
28 November 1980

Envoys warn Reagan on El Salvador

By Stephen Kinzer
Globe Correspondent

A group of disgruntled diplomats and intelligence experts in Washington has charged that US policy in Central America is "dangerously misguided" and warned that "the Reagan administration's first international crisis may well be in El Salvador."

The authors of a privately circulated "dissent paper" argued further that, "Should President Reagan choose to use military force in El Salvador, historians will be able to show that the setting for such actions had been prepared in the last year of the Carter Administration."

The anonymous specialists urge the United States to abandon its support for the beleaguered civilian-military junta ruling El Salvador and seek a "nonmilitary, negotiated solution" with guerrillas that would be "effective in achieving the two key objectives of US policy in this region: limiting Cuban and Soviet expansion and promoting the emergence of stable and pluralistic governments."

The origin of the paper has aroused nearly as much controversy as its conclusions. A few copies were circulated in Washington last week. The 30-page treatise, dated Nov. 6, is unsigned and attributed only to "current and former officials" at the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA and the National Security Council. "Employees from other agencies active in El Salvador and Central America — but normally excluded from policy debates — also contributed to these notes," it said.

The cover of the manuscript carries the legend "Dissent Channel," but independent inquiries revealed that it never passed through that channel, normally used by junior officers in embassies abroad to send minority opinions to Washington.

Lawrence Birns of the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs, who is familiar with the range of proposals for dealing with the situation in El Salvador, concluded that "it was written by a government employee and probably someone in the State Department. A number of people were obviously involved in writing it." He characterized the level of analysis as "sophisticated," an assessment shared even by sources who did not agree with its conclusions.

A government official said the paper "lays out the minority view on El Salvador about as cogently and authoritatively as anyone has since we set the policy last year."

The paper, which concentrates on El Salvador but deals with nearby countries as well, refers to several aspects of American operations in Central America that have not been widely known. For example, according to the authors:

- The United States has stepped up training of Salvadoran troops in the Panama Canal Zone, and "we have obtained some evidence" that the United States is stockpiling arms there for possible use in El Salvador. "This training program is the largest ever sponsored by the US for any Latin American country in a single year."

- American planners are "updating detailed contingency plans for ... deployment of military forces in El Salvador and Guatemala ... Various government agencies have taken preparatory steps to intervene militarily in El Salvador."

- Besides the United States, the "most solid bloc of support" for the government in El Salvador comes from the dictatorships of Chile, Uruguay and Argentina, and "Argentina has become the second largest trainer of Salvadoran officers after the US."

- The United States has expressed "willingness" to side with military-run Honduras if its border clashes with revolutionary Nicaragua escalate to open hostilities.

- "US intelligence has been in contact with Nicaraguan exile groups in Guatemala and in Miami and it is aware of their relationship with Cuban exile terrorist groups operating in the US," and "... no attempt has been made to restrict their mobility in and out of the US or to interfere with their activities."

Government and private sources in Washington would not directly deny any of these revelations. In fact, the inclusion of these pieces of information in the "dissent paper" has lent it an air of authenticity and credibility that distinguishes it from the mass of policy papers floating through government bureaucracies.

"Considering some of the insights in the document, it would be very difficult for someone on the outside to write it," observed a Latin America specialist who is conversant with American intelli-

CONTINUED

gence operations and who had been given a copy. The thesis of the paper is that the United States has "identified our strategic interests in Central America with a relatively weak, unpopular and isolated regime" while underestimating the "domestic legitimacy and international support enjoyed by the opposition ... Our actions and our words have narrowed down our policy to a single path of gradual escalation of direct military involvement in a region vital to our national interests and within a political context that gives the use of force few chances to achieve a satisfactory outcome."

According to this analysis, the United States underestimates both "the political costs of world reaction" to intervention in Central America and also the "Nicaraguan and Cuban commitment to provide military support to Salvadoran guerrillas in the event of a continued escalation of US involvement." This is due in part to "inaccurate intelligence and on suppression within various bureaucracies of verified contradictory information."

Since the United States "does not at this time have the political credibility to spearhead a mediation effort," the report urges American "disengagement" from El Salvador and suggests that a "Zimbabwe solution" for a transfer of power be supervised by other Latin nations that are trusted by both sides.

"A key objective of US policy in Central America is to limit Cuban- and Soviet-bloc influence in the region... Few developments would open more opportunities for Cuba in Central America than the regionalization of armed conflict that would follow the escalation of US military involvement in El Salvador... Therefore, to limit opportunities for Soviet-Cuban expansion, the US should avoid regionalization of armed conflict by reversing the current trend towards escalating its own military involvement."

The document says that Mexico, Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela and Costa Rica are edging away from their support of the American posture. In Nicaragua, the leftist regime is closely allied with the Salvadoran rebels, and its desire to aid the rebels in a confrontation "would provide ample opportunities for increased Cuban- and Soviet-bloc leverage in the country" and create "strong pressure" for Nicaragua "to make a strategic alliance with the Soviet bloc."

The "dissent paper" has been publicized in some Latin American newspapers, and in Washington a State Department specialist said it "has raised a few eyebrows and gotten a few noses out of joint because there's stuff in there that's not supposed to be public. But it's nothing real serious, and maybe it will give a jolt to Reagan's people when they find out what a mess they're in down there."

Robert White, the American ambassador to El Salvador, returned to Washington for consultations last week and said in a telephone interview that the "dissent paper" contains "a lot of assumptions I don't share, but it was obviously written by a knowledgeable person, perhaps someone formerly in government or someone who had access to internal State Department communications."

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CHINA/TAIWAN ISSUE

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE
2 December 1980

China attacks Reagan aide

By Timothy McNulty

Peking Correspondent

Chicago Tribune Press Service

PEKING—China took off the diplomatic gloves Monday, attacking Ray Cline, a foreign policy adviser to President-elect Ronald Reagan, for insulting the nation and "interfering" in China's internal affairs.

The New China News Agency said Cline "disgraced" the United States and should "blush" at the falseness of his words.

In essence, it called him a coward and a liar.

The verbal slugging started late last week, when Cline, an ardent Taiwan sympathizer, said China should return to the norms of civilized behavior and announce a policy of nonforce toward Taiwan.

CLINE ALSO SAID this nation was "too weak militarily to be a useful ally to the United States," and that the much heralded "China card" is only a deuce.

The Chinese reply, written by the news agency's Washington correspondent, Peng Di, attacked Cline only but it was seen here as a warning to Reagan's new administration that China will not take insults lightly.

"The Chinese," wrote Peng, "are a proud people despite their apparent poverty. They have not the habit of currying favor with or bending their knees to any foreign power. And they know how to deal with those who try to provoke them and show disdain to their national feelings and sovereign rights."

THE ARTICLE also pointed out that Cline, who is touted for a national intelligence job in the Reagan administration, was a former CIA station chief in Taipei [1957-63] and he is now executive director of studies at the conservative think-tank, the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies.

CLINE'S WORDS rubbed salt into the sore left by Reagan's campaign fall that the U.S. should restore "normal" diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Although Reagan since has been conciliatory, the Chinese are wary of the new administration over the Taiwan issue.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 24THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 December 1980

Learning to use chopsticks

Ronald Reagan has carefully sought to modify former views that set China's teeth on edge. He has also tried to assure Peking — through the visit of vice-president-elect George Bush, for example — that his administration will seek good relations with the People's Republic. Hence it is mystifying that a Reagan adviser should now have drawn such a strong verbal broadside from the official Chinese press. The President-elect has acted quickly to forestall further damage by sending a memorandum to 120 foreign policy advisers warning them they could not speak for him when traveling abroad.

He may need to do more, however, and that is to signal Peking that he is not altering course again.

The adviser in this instance, Georgetown University professor and former CIA deputy chief Ray Cline, was in Taiwan recently and there, according to reports, suggested that China should open itself to the outside world, declare a policy of nonforce in respect to Taiwan, and return to the norms of "civilized behavior." Not surprisingly, his remarks antagonized authorities in Peking, who proceeded to blast Dr. Cline for flagrantly interfering in China's internal affairs. Not an auspicious turn of events for the Reagan government-in-waiting.

In fairness, it should be noted that Dr. Cline says his "private" mission to Asia was planned before the Reagan landslide. But it is only natural that, as a Reagan foreign policy adviser, his public statements would be scrupulously scanned in Peking and other Asian capitals for indications of how Mr. Reagan would approach matters once in office. On this occasion the Reagan transition team does seem to have slipped up. We trust Mr. Reagan is not hardening his position.

Not that Dr. Cline does not have worthwhile things to say. His warnings against "playing the China card" against the Soviet Union by building up the People's Republic militarily, for instance, deserve thoughtful consideration by the new administration. But the idea of upgrading US relations with Taiwan — when the whole situation in Taiwan has worked out splendidly since the normalization of ties with Peking — is needlessly asking for trouble.

The new US relationship with China does not mean Washington should bow to every Chinese request or should not act in its own national interest, even at Peking's displeasure. But it would be diplomatically shortsighted, indeed dangerous, to slight the importance of maintaining good ties with the most populous nation in the world, one bound to play a growing global role.

In this context, the Reagan memorandum comes none too soon.

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ON PAGE 11

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
1 December 1980

Reagan adviser: US should warm toward Taiwan, boost Pacific defenses

By Frederic A. Moritz
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Singapore

Just how differently will the United States behave toward Asia under President Reagan?

In what may or may not be a glimpse of changes to come, a Reagan adviser who toured the region last week stressed the need for:

- Upgrading US relations with Taiwan — including the sending of a special presidential envoy to Taipei, the capital.
- Boosting US military power in the Pacific.
- Slowing the process of improving relations with Vietnam.
- Shaping a more predictable policy toward the region by firming up US commitments to consult with and defend its Southeast Asian "friends," especially Thailand.

The whirlwind tour by Georgetown University professor Ray Cline to Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan kept government leaders from Moscow to Tokyo busy trying to sort out the incoming administration's foreign policy puzzle.

The affable, bearded professor repeatedly denied that he spoke for the Reagan administration. He insisted that his "private" fact-finding mission was planned before the Reagan landslide. But speculation that he may be appointed assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs has given prominence to his personal views and statements of what the new administration should or might do.

Professor Cline, a former deputy director of intelligence in the CIA, was long a leading opponent of normalizing relations with China. Now he favors improving US relations with Taiwan (which, theoretically, has only unofficial ties with the United States).

Unlike some specialists who stress the dispute between China and the Soviet Union, Dr. Cline sees China as part of a threatening totalitarian communist world dominating the Asian heartland.

The United States, he argues, should not "play the China card" against the Soviet Union by building it up militarily and economically; China is far too weak to be an effective military ally against the Soviet Union. There is no substitute for strengthening America's own military power to counter the Soviet Union, according to Dr. Cline, who says that most but not all of Mr. Reagan's advisers agree on this point.


While his views point toward a cooling of the US-China economic and political climate, he says he favors continued economic contacts and encouragement to "civilize" China's behavior. China should be helped to look toward the West and capitalistic methods, rather than to the Soviet Union, to modernize. It should also be prodded to refrain from supporting insurgents in Southeast Asia or to use force against Taiwan.

In another area, Dr. Cline suggested that efforts to negotiate with Vietnam be slowed down. He advocates fewer active proposals such as those carried out under President Carter by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke.

He maintains the US aim should be to sit back and wait, encouraging Vietnam over the long run to avoid dependence on the Soviet Union.

Unlike what he described as the Holbrooke approach, US policy toward Vietnam should be seen to be guided more by involvement in the area than by what has become an impression of disengagement.

According to Dr. Cline, countries like Thailand and Malaysia felt they "did not register on the scoreboard" under the Carter administration. Southeast Asia countries were



unsure of US priorities and were not consulted often enough.

Now they are looking for predictability — a sense that the US will keep its commitments and an accurate assessment of just what US military strength and strategic planning in the area will bring.

Dr. Cline also maintains that growing Soviet naval power in the Pacific and the Vietnamese-Soviet presence in Cambodia have threatened to intimidate Southeast Asian countries, especially Thailand. He expressed hope that a two-to-three year program of building up US air and sea power in the region will reassure these countries and counter the Soviet presence.

Under President Reagan it should be made clear the United States will firmly back Thailand against a Vietnamese attack, he said.

Dr. Cline expressed hope that members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia) might be able to help bring about a political compromise in Cambodia similar to that achieved in Zimbabwe in Africa. He suggested that the United States might stand on the sidelines and let ASEAN take the initiative.

Under this approach, "third force" leaders backed by neither China nor Vietnam might compete in free Cambodian elections supervised by independent observers. Cambodia could be isolated from the two countries if an independent government emerged. Dr. Cline conceded Vietnam would have to agree to such an approach, which so far it has refused to do.

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ON PAGE A4

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
1 December 1980

Peking Rebukes Reagan Adviser For Comments on Taiwan Policy

PEKING (UPI) — China attacked one of President-elect Ronald Reagan's foreign policy advisers yesterday, saying the aide "disgraced" the United States and sought to "provoke" Peking.

A commentary carried by the official Xinhua news agency took aim at comments made by Reagan adviser Ray S. Cline at a news conference Wednesday in Singapore.

The agency said Cline sounded like a "self-styled spokesman of American civilization" by saying that China should "open up the country to the outside world . . . announce a policy of non-force towards Taiwan . . . (and) return to the norms of civilized behavior."

The commentary — by the agency's Washington correspondent, Peng Di — said, "It is hardly 'civilized behavior' for an American to lecture a foreign country to open itself up to the outside world and

to attain national reunification in a way he deems fit.

"Mr. Cline has actually disgraced his own country by showing contempt to the norms of international relations."

The commentary added, "It seems this former deputy chief of the Central Intelligence Agency . . . has made up his mind to provoke China in a premeditated manner."

Such commentaries in Xinhua invariably reflect official thinking in China and carry a force just short of a formal rebuke.

The agency also recalled an article that Cline wrote in October for The Washington Star in which, the commentary said, Cline "insisted Taiwan is a sovereign state by the name of 'The Republic of China,' a 'neighbor' of China and an 'ally' of the United States."

Cline's assertion, the commentary said, "constitutes a flagrant interference in China's internal affairs."

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MISCELLANEOUS

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NEWS SERVICE

Date. 3 Dec. 80

Item No. 2

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DISTRIBUTION II

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(JONESTOWN)

(BY DANIEL GILMORE)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE HAS FOUND "NO EVIDENCE AT ALL" TO LINK THE CIA OR FBI WITH THE JONESTOWN MASS SUICIDE AND MURDER IN THE JUNGLES OF GUYANA TWO YEARS AGO, UPI LEARNED TODAY.

COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EDWARD BOLAND, D-MASS., SAID THE PANEL COULD FIND NO CONNECTION WITH ANY U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE NOV. 18, 1978, TRAGEDY INVOLVING THE PEOPLES TEMPLE CULT LED BY JIM JONES AND IN WHICH A CONGRESSMAN AND THREE WEST COAST NEWSMEN WERE MURDERED.

IN A LETTER TO REP. CLEMENT ZABLOCKI, D-WIS., CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE WHO HAD REQUESTED THE INVESTIGATION, BOLAND SAID HIS PANEL INTERVIEWED THOSE MAKING ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, QUESTIONED CIA AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS, AND REVIEWED ALL RELEVANT GOVERNMENT FILES.

"THE COMMITTEE HAS FOUND NO EVIDENCE AT ALL TO SUGGEST THAT THE CIA KNEW ANYTHING ABOUT THE JONESTOWN TRAGEDY BEFORE IT OCCURRED OR THAT THE AGENCY HAD ANY CONNECTION WITH EITHER JIM JONES OR THE PEOPLES TEMPLE," BOLAND WROTE. "ACCORDINGLY, THE COMMITTEE WILL CONDUCT NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEGATIONS MADE TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS."

BOLAND SAID THE PANEL ALSO REVIEWED ALLEGATIONS OF INVOLVEMENT BY OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, INCLUDING THE FBI, BUT "DETERMINED THAT NO EVIDENCE HAS COME TO ITS ATTENTION WHICH SUPPORT SUCH ALLEGATIONS."

REP. LEO RYAN, D-CALIF., WAS SHOT TO DEATH BY JONES HENCHMEN AT A JUNGLE AIRSTRIP. ALSO KILLED WERE DON HARRIS OF NBC-TV, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER PHOTOGRAPHER GREGORY ROBINSON, NBC CAMERAMAN ROBERT BROWN, AND A WOMAN TEMPLE DEFECTOR.

UPI 12-03-80 03:33 PES

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ON PAGE 2-25

LOS ANGELES TIMES
3 DECEMBER 1980

Former Cellmate Reported Aiding Hunt for Boyce

A former cellmate of escaped spy Christopher Boyce is reportedly feeding federal authorities information he learned while the two were in prison together, including a list of "safe houses" where Boyce periodically seeks refuge.

Lynn Dale Bogart, one of four people arrested in a \$7.5-million Riverside County counterfeiting case, told the Riverside Press-Enterprise that the safe houses were in and around Los Angeles.

He also said that Boyce, who escaped from Lompoc federal prison Jan. 21, "has more money than he knows what to do with" because of payoffs he received from the Soviets for the sale of U.S. government secrets.

Boyce, a UC Riverside student at the time of his arrest, was convicted in 1977 of selling classified information to the Soviet Union.

A federal source close to the search for Boyce confirmed that a deal was struck between Bogart and the federal task force that has been trying to find Boyce for 10 months.

OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS NEWS SERVICE

Date 2 Dec. 1980
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DISTRIBUTION II.

FBC-EVANSNOVAK-12-02

NOTE TO EVANS-NOVAK SUBSCRIBERS:

ROWLAND EVANS OF THE EVANS-NOVAK TEAM WILL LEAVE SHORTLY FOR A WEEK OF REPORTING FROM CRISIS-TORN POLAND AND WEST GERMANY. HIS REPORTS FROM POLAND WILL CONCENTRATE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN THAT COUNTRY AS WELL AS THE EFFECTS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND TRADE UNION MOVEMENT.

FROM THERE EVANS WILL CONTINUE ON TO WEST GERMANY TO REPORT ON THE SHAPE OF THE NATO ALLIANCE AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND WEST GERMANY DURING THE COMING REAGAN ADMINISTRATION.

IN EVANS' ABSENCE, ROBERT NOVAK WILL CONTINUE REPORTING ON EVENTS IN WASHINGTON.

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INSIDE REPORT

RELEASE WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1980

BY ROWLAND EVANS AND ROBERT NOVAK

TRUTH FROM THE CIA

WASHINGTON -- THE TOP-SECRET, YEAR-END INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON THE U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC BALANCE, THE GRAVEST SINCE WORLD WAR II, IS GETTING FINAL TOUCHES -- AND, FOR A CHANGE, NO MAJOR DISSENTS -- BEFORE BEING SENT TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRESIDENT-ELECT REAGAN SHORTLY.

BETWEEN THE LINES, THE REPORT FROM ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), DEMOLISHES HOPES OF THE ARMS CONTROL LOBBY THAT A NEW ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT (SALT) SOMEHOW CAN RESTORE THE STRATEGIC BALANCE OF POWER. ONE OFFICIAL FAMILIAR WITH ITS DETAILS TOLD US THE REPORT SPELLS THIS OUT: GROWING SUPERIORITY OF SOVIET STRATEGIC MISSILES CAN ONLY BE OVERCOME BY "NEW PRODUCTION, NOT NEW CONTROLS."

KNOWN AS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 11-3-8 COVERING THE NEW YEAR OF 1981; THE REPORT IS THE FIRST IN SEVERAL YEARS TO EMERGE FROM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WITHOUT SERIOUS DISSENT FROM THE CIA'S TURNER. "THE ADMIRAL HAS HARDLY ANY FOOTNOTES," ONE INSIDER SAID. FOOTNOTES ARE THE TRADITIONAL MECHANISM FOR DISSENTERS TO REGISTER DISAGREEMENTS WITHOUT FORCING MAJOR REVISION IN THE MAIN TEXT. FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS, TURNER AND SOME OF HIS SOVIET SPECIALISTS HAVE EITHER BEEN FEROCIOUS FOOTNOTE WRITERS, OR HAVE BEEN THE TARGETS OF PROFUSE FOOTNOTES BY PENTAGON REALISTS.

THE CIA'S TENDENCY TO DOWNPLAY SOVIET PROGRESS IN OUTSPENDING AND OUTPRODUCING THE U.S. IN THE WEAPONS OF STRATEGIC WARFARE HAS NOT BEEN LIMITED TO THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. BESET BY INTERNAL FEUDS, THE CIA IN 1976 HIRED OUTSIDERS (KNOWN AS "TEAM B") TO HELP ITS OWN EXPERTS PREPARE THE NIE 11-3-8 COVERING THE FIRST YEAR OF CARTER'S PRESIDENCY.

SINCE THEN, TURNER'S DISSENTS TO THE FINDINGS OF OTHER AGENCIES HAVE TENDED TO DILUTE THE FINAL PRODUCT. THUS, THE ESTIMATE FOR 1981 NOW GETTING FINISHING TOUCHES IS THE FIRST IN YEARS SOLIDLY BACKED BY BOTH CAREER AND POLITICAL OFFICE-HOLDERS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

THEIR AGREEMENT SHOWS THAT DEBATE OVER SOVIET SUPERIORITY HAS BEEN RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF EXPERTS WHO WERE ONCE CALLED ALARMIST BY THE ARMS CONTROLLERS. THOSE ARM CONTROLLERS, IN TURN, ARE FORCED INTO THE BACK SEAT.

TO THE INCOMING PRESIDENT, THE MORE THAN 350 PAGES OF NIE 11-3-8 WILL MAKE FRIGHTENING READING; FOR ALL OF HIS CAMPAIGN PROMISES TO BUILD U.S. STRATEGIC STRENGTH BACK TO "A MARGIN OF SAFETY." THE REPORT CONTRADICTS THE MAJOR CARTER ADMINISTRATION CLAIM THAT THIS NATION'S STRATEGIC STRENGTH GIVES IT "ESSENTIAL EQUIVALANCE." THAT WAS A DUBIOUS CONCLUSION WHEN IT WAS FIRST PRONOUNCED NEARLY FOUR YEARS AGO AND ONE NOW TORN TO SHREDS IN THE NEW INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.

TEARING IT TO SHREDS WERE CARTER'S REPEATED DECISIONS SLICING OFF AND DISCARDING ONE STRATEGIC PROGRAM AFTER ANOTHER. THEY INCLUDED THE B-1 PENETRATION BOMBER; THE NEUTRON WARHEAD FOR THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE; ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE BIG LAND-BASED MX MISSILE; THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE AND CRUISE MISSILES.

CARTER'S THESIS WAS THE HEART OF ERROR: WE DON'T NEED THESE SYSTEMS BECAUSE WE ALREADY HAVE ESSENTIAL EQUIVALANCE; WHAT WE NEED IS ARMS CONTROL.

INSTEAD: WARNINGS ISSUED WHEN CARTER BECAME PRESIDENT HAVE PREMATURELY BORNE THEIR BITTER FRUIT. HE WAS WARNED THAT THE U.S. WOULD FACE A 'WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY' BY THE MID-'80S EVEN IF HE ORDERED FULL SPEED AHEAD ON THESE DISCARDED SYSTEMS. HE DID NOT; AND THE 'WINDOW' IS NOW PREMATURELY OPEN. REAGAN HAS LITTLE CHANCE TO CLOSE IT DURING HIS FIRST TERM.

THIS REALITY EXPLAINS WHY REAGAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY INSIDERS WERE SO ANGERED BY THE DISTORTION OF REAGAN'S SALT POSITION GIVEN THE WEST GERMAN BUNDESTAG BY CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT. THIS REALITY MAKES A GROTESQUE OUT OF SEN. CHARLES PERCY'S MESSAGE TO SOVIET PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV THAT REAGAN PLACES THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON A SALT ACCORD.

THE NEW NIE 11-3-8 STUDY OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE MOCKS SUCH PLEASANTRIES. REAGAN WILL ASSUME OFFICE AT A TIME OF GRAVEST DANGER TO THIS NATION. NOTHING BUT DIPLOMACY AND PERHAPS A LITTLE BRAVADO STAND BETWEEN U.S. SECURITY AND SOVIET POWER TO WIPE OUT U.S. LAND-BASED MISSILES AND BOMBERS WITH A SINGLE COUNTERFORCE ATTACK.

ARMS CONTROL TALKS; OR EVEN AGREEMENTS THAT ELIMINATE MAJOR HAZARDS FROM CARTER'S DYING SALT II TREATY; CANNOT RECTIFY THE STRATEGIC IMBALANCE THAT TURNER IS ABOUT TO DOCUMENT FOR CARTER AND REAGAN. THE CIA'S FINDINGS LEAVE ONLY ONE ROUTE TO SAFETY: PRODUCTION OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS; WITHOUT ANY SPEED LIMIT.

ENDIT EVANSNOVAK

NY-1202 0640EST

Page 3 of 3

ANN ARBOR NEWS (MI)
10 November 1980

Stop punishing CIA and remove constraints

Editor, The News:

I do not consider myself either an ultra-conservative or an ultra-liberal. By placing myself somewhere between these two extremes, I trust that I speak as one of many with moderate views.

But given our liberal society, could it be a reality that the irresponsible use of our rights, liberties and freedoms by some will guide us neatly into the stretched-out arms of a non-democratic world?

I am referring to that small portion of U of M students that suggested the "University of Michigan should oust CIA recruiters." This type of self-destructive

short-sighted reasoning presents to many of us a dubious scenario for the future of our country.

It would be an understatement to suggest that the CIA has a difficult responsibility. But radical demands for CIA reform has resulted in a new CIA with more rules, more regulations, and increased accountability that has ultimately resulted in a functionally depressed, ineffective agency.

Whether we like it or not, it is a fact that this world remains a dangerous place far from a utopia where democracy can conduct all of its business openly. The U.S. must have intelligence from those areas of the world where information is suppressed, con-

fused, or conflicting. We must stop punishing the CIA and remove some of the constraints that keep it from doing its job.

The University is not, as was stated by the Coalition to Oppose CIA Recruitment, "conditioning us, as students, to seek employment with government agencies like the CIA". We students possess unlimited opportunities and may use our "free will" to either accept or decline employment with our government.

Thus, I must encourage our University community to uphold its democratic policies that foster opportunities to work for our government should we so desire.

Jeffery Abrahamson

MILWAUKEE JOURNAL
6 November 1980

Kasten to fight proposed CIA charter

By Donald Pfarrer
of The Journal Staff

Sen.-Elect. Robert W. Kasten Jr. (R-Wis.) said Wednesday that he would oppose the charter being drafted to govern the CIA because it scatters supervision of the agency too widely among congressional committees.

Kasten, who served on the House committee that investigated the CIA in the mid-1970s, said he would favor a single joint committee modeled on the Atomic Energy Committee to oversee the work of the intelligence agency. The committee, he said, should be made up of House and Senate leaders.

Kasten said the election had delivered a clear message that the country wanted "the strongest possible CIA" as part of a stronger national defense, and he said there was no conflict between this goal and the preservation of civil liberties.

At a press conference in his Fox Point campaign headquarters, Kasten praised his vanquished adversary, Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.), as "a true giant in the state of Wisconsin." He said Nelson's integrity and skill were a credit to the state.

Kasten defeated Nelson in Tuesday's election 1,101,669 to 1,061,899.

He said the key to his upset victory was his abil-

ity to cut into the traditional Democratic vote, particularly in the 4th Congressional District. He said he had needed 42% or 43% of the Milwaukee County vote and got about 45%.

"I don't feel the election was a defeat, in a way, for Gaylord Nelson," he said. "It was a victory for Bob Kasten. The people voted for a change."

He said abortion and other "traditional family value" issues were nowhere near as important as economic issues in the campaign. What the election showed, in Wisconsin and the nation, he continued, was the strong desire for less government

intervention and less government spending.

"I believe we are part of a victory for new leadership, new direction, for a less restrictive government and for an effort to restore the rewards for work," he said.

He called his victory "a wonderful surprise" and said the newspaper polls that had showed him as much as 20 percentage points behind Nelson probably reflected the low point of his campaign.

A lot of people, he said, decided to vote for him in the last two days of the campaign. He added that about two days before the polls opened he himself had come to believe he'd win.

Kasten said he hoped to serve on committees dealing with finance, taxation and budget; his second choice would be intelligence and foreign affairs.

He said he would introduce legislation to limit senators and congressmen to 12 years' service — a policy he has advocated in past campaigns — but would not impose a 12-year limit on his own service unless the Congress adopted his bill.

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ON PAGE 36

FAMILY CIRCLE
16 DECEMBER 1980

